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Abstract 
Essays on Foreign Firms Following Deregistration from U.S. Exchanges 
by 
Kathleen Michelle Bakarich 
Adviser: Professor Joseph Weintrop 
 
In 2007 the SEC introduced Rule 12h-6, which significantly reduced the requirements for cross-
listed firms to leave U.S. markets.  While the benefits and costs of cross-listing in the U.S. have 
been widely analyzed in prior literature, questions as to the impact of deregistration on firms, 
investors, and other parties have been raised given the increase in foreign firms leaving the U.S. 
over the past decade.  In addition, the growing global adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) and worldwide regulatory developments over this time period have brought 
changes to the home markets to which deregistering firms return potentially influencing the impact 
of deregistration.  This dissertation consists of two chapters that analyze samples of foreign cross-
listed firms that voluntarily deregister from U.S. equity markets.  In Chapter 1, I examine whether 
a benefit of cross-listing, improved accounting quality, is impacted when foreign firms deregister.  
In Chapter 2, I examine whether a cost of cross-listing, a fee premium paid to auditors, is impacted 
when foreign firms deregister.  Additionally, in both chapters I analyze the characteristics of the 
home market that influence these associations.   
Chapter 1:  For a sample of 122 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from 2004 through 2012, 
I find that deregistration from the U.S. is associated with greater abnormal accruals, a lower 
likelihood of reporting a loss, and less timely recognition of economic losses compared to both 
before the firm deregistered and to a matched control firm that still maintains a U.S. cross-listing.  
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Upon further examination, I find the decrease in accounting quality is not significant for firms 
returning to home markets that require IFRS, but rather the significant decrease is attributable only 
to foreign firms returning to non-IFRS environments.   Additional tests show that the level of 
regulatory quality in the home market, relative to the U.S., is not a significant mitigating factor in 
the negative association between deregistration and accounting quality.  These findings imply that, 
after controlling for country and regulatory effects, accounting standards play a significant role in 
explaining the relationship between deregistration from U.S. exchanges and financial reporting 
quality. 
Chapter 2:  For a sample of 105 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from 2004 through 2013, 
I find that deregistration is associated with a decrease in audit fees compared to both before the 
firm deregistered and to a matched control firm that still maintains a U.S. cross-listing.  This 
significant decrease is attributable only to foreign firms returning to non-IFRS environments, 
which is consistent with the high complexity and effort associated with auditing IFRS financial 
statements.  Additional tests show the level of legal liability auditors are exposed to in the home 
market is not a significant mitigating factor in the negative association between deregistration and 
audit fees.  These findings imply that, after controlling for country and legal effects, the difference 
in the complexity of accounting standards is a significant factor explaining the impact of 
deregistration on audit fees. 
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Chapter 1: Going back home: how deregistration from the U.S. impacts foreign firms’ 
accounting quality 
1.1 Introduction 
With a wide variety of accounting principles and varying degrees of corporate governance 
worldwide, one way for firms from countries with weaker accounting and enforcement 
environments to signal improvements in financial reporting is to cross-list in the U.S.  By 
subjecting themselves to more stringent disclosure requirements and regulations, cross-listed firms 
raise market valuations through mechanisms such as increasing transparency and improving 
investor protection (Stulz 1999; Coffee 1999; Reese and Weisbach 2002; Pagano, Röell, and 
Zechner 2002; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2004).  These mechanisms are also associated with 
significant increases in accounting quality (Lang, Raedy, and Yetman 2003b).  Historically, one 
cost of listing in the U.S., however, was the inability to easily delist given the prohibitively high 
transaction costs of deregistration. 
The adoption of SEC Rule 12h-6 in March 2007 changed the cross-listing landscape by 
relaxing the deregistration requirements for foreign firms listed in the U.S.  The SEC argued this 
amendment “should result in reduced costs to issuers in determining whether they can terminate 
their Exchange Act reporting obligations” (SEC 2007b, 19) because deregistration requirements 
will be based on more easily obtainable information and will not require annual re-verification.1  
An expected benefit of the amendment was that it “should over time remove an impediment to 
foreign company access and participation in U.S. public capital markets while still providing U.S. 
investors with the protections afforded by our Exchange Act reporting regime” (SEC 2007b, 81). 
However, the passing of Rule 12h-6 resulted in a growing number of foreign firms voluntarily 
                                                          
1 Rule 12h-6 considers the requirements for deregistration to be met if the ratio of average U.S. daily trading to 
worldwide trading volume is less than 5%. This replaces the former requirement that the number of U.S. resident 
record holders must be less than 300. The previous rule was problematic for many foreign firms because the effort to 
obtain address records to verify the specific country of residence of its investors was costly and difficult (SEC 2007b).  
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deregistering from U.S. markets, coinciding with a decreasing trend in the number of foreign firms 
listed on major U.S. exchanges (see Figure 1.1).  These deregistrations even eclipsed new cross-
listings in some years (see Figure 1.2).   
It is within this setting that I test the association between deregistration from the U.S. and 
accounting quality.  The association between improvements in accounting quality and cross-listing 
appear to be specific to firms subject to SEC rules and disclosure and not firms cross-listed on the 
OTC or in other overseas markets (Lang et al. 2003b).  Deregistration from the U.S. releases 
foreign firms from the SEC’s oversight and Exchange Act reporting, which may trigger a change 
in firms’ financial reporting environments.  The SEC has voiced its concern regarding this potential 
impact of deregistration on investors, and in particular, the role that a foreign firm’s home market 
may play in either exacerbating or mitigating that effect: 
“If Exchange Act disclosure requirements provide more information or protection to U.S. 
or other investors than is provided in an issuer's primary trading market, then all investors, 
both U.S. and foreign, may suffer the costs of losing that information and protection upon 
Exchange Act termination. Conversely, in countries that have similar regulatory regimes 
and levels of investor protection the impact of U.S. deregistration may be mitigated” (SEC 
2007b). 
Thus, after first examining the association between deregistration and accounting quality to ensure 
there is an effect to disentangle, I then further examine whether this association is impacted by the 
level of reporting and disclosure information or regulation in firms’ home markets.   
Given the U.S. is long associated with the highest levels of earnings quality (or lowest 
levels of earnings management) relative to other countries (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003; 
Francis and Wang 2008), the SEC requires cross-listed firms to either reconcile net income and 
shareholders’ equity to U.S. GAAP or report their financial statements in full accordance with U.S. 
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GAAP.2 This requirement was in place until 2007, when changes in the global accounting 
environment led the SEC to amend its policy.  Since the time many firms originally cross-listed in 
the U.S., the use of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has grown worldwide.  
Recognizing that “financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS as issued by the 
[International Accounting Standards Board] IASB are of sufficient quality” (SEC 2007a, 84), the 
SEC removed the reconciliation requirement to U.S. GAAP for foreign firms using IFRS.   
With the widespread adoption of IFRS in recent years, many deregistering firms return to 
home markets which mandate the use of these global accounting standards.   For example, in the 
press release announcing Norwegian firm Norsk Hydro’s intention to delist from the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) in October 2007 after twenty-one years of cross-listing, the firm asserted 
that, among other reasons: 
“Internationalization of capital markets and the introduction of International Financial 
Reporting Standards as the primary financial reporting standards in Europe have also 
significantly reduced the need for and benefit of multiple stock-exchange listings… 
delisting and deregistration will enable us to simplify financial reporting processes, while 
maintaining the same high-quality financial reporting and disclosures.” (Norsk Hydro 
2007). 
This statement indicates that for this firm, and other IFRS users, deregistration from the U.S. is 
not expected to significantly change financial reporting quality given their home-market reporting 
and disclosure environments are viewed as providing the same high-quality as the U.S.  If changes 
in firms’ accounting standards and disclosure environments drive changes in accounting quality 
following deregistration, and IFRS provides comparable reporting quality, then it is expected that 
firms from countries with lower quality home market accounting standards (i.e. non-IFRS) will 
                                                          
2 For example, in examining Daimler-Benz’s 1993 decision to cross-list in the U.S., Ball (2004) argues the firm’s 
change to U.S. GAAP bonded it to forego the flexibility in financial reporting permitted under German GAAP and 
commit itself to publicly report losses in a timely fashion, which help to monitor and discipline managers’ actions. 
                                                                        
4 
 
exhibit larger deregistration effects, while firms from countries using IFRS will exhibit 
insignificant changes around deregistration.   
The incentive to follow accounting standards, however, may depend on the underlying 
enforcement mechanisms firms face in the market, which is particularly important in an 
international context (Ball, Kothari, and Robin 2000).  Leuz and Wysocki (2015) argue that “it is 
far from clear whether IFRS will be superior, or effective, in countries that have different 
institutions and may lack potentially complementary institutions to support the effective 
application and enforcement of the uniform global standards” (p. 88).  Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 
(2013) find that it is changes in enforcement rather than changes in accounting standards that drive 
changes in market liquidity.  Following these arguments, the source of the relationship between 
deregistration and accounting quality is more likely to be associated with the regulatory quality of 
the home market, rather than the accounting environment.  It is then expected that firms from 
countries with weaker enforcement environments compared to the U.S. will exhibit larger 
decreases in accounting quality following deregistration, while firms from countries with 
comparable enforcement environments will exhibit no significant changes.   
The sample consists of 122 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from 2004 through 2012. 
Firms are considered to have higher financial reporting quality when abnormal accruals are lower, 
the probability of reporting a loss is greater, and economic losses are reported in a timely manner 
(e.g. Basu 1997; Jones 1991; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Francis, Michas, and Seavey 2013).  
These measures capture properties of earnings and have been used extensively in prior literature 
examining determinants of earnings quality (Dechow, Ge, and Schrand 2010).3  I find that a 
deregistration from the U.S. is associated with greater abnormal accruals, a lower likelihood of 
                                                          
3 These tests are also robust to using earnings smoothing measures from Leuz et al. (2003) as proxies for financial 
reporting quality.  See Section 1.5 and Tables 1.6 and 1.7 for further information. 
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reporting a loss, and less timely recognition of economic losses compared to both before the firm 
deregistered and to a matched control firm that still maintains a U.S. cross-listing.  
To determine if this relationship is affected by the accounting standards and disclosure or 
regulation and enforcement in deregistering firms’ home markets, I follow prior literature and  
“exploit institutional differences across settings to tease out the sources of cross-listing effects” 
(Leuz 2003a, 352).4  Given some of the evidence cited above regarding the comparable high-
quality of IFRS, I classify firms based on their home market accounting environments (i.e. IFRS 
or non-IFRS) to test if the negative association between deregistration and accounting quality is 
mitigated when firms return to accounting and disclosure environments comparable to the U.S.  
Similarly, to determine if the source of the deregistration effects is the regulatory environment, I 
use the World Bank’s Regulatory Quality index to capture firms returning to home markets with 
comparable regulatory quality.5  In doing so, I test if the negative association between 
deregistration and accounting quality is mitigated when firms return to enforcement environments 
comparable to the U.S.   
When controlling for the home market accounting environment, I find the decrease in 
accounting quality is not significant for firms returning to home markets that require IFRS, but 
rather the significant decrease is attributable only to foreign firms returning to non-IFRS 
environments. On the other hand, when controlling for the regulatory environment in the home 
market, I find the negative association between deregistration and accounting quality is not 
mitigated by home markets with higher regulatory quality.  When including both variables in the 
                                                          
4 Leuz (2003a) argues that prior research has focused on the main or average effect of cross-listing rather than 
potentially more interesting interactive effects of institutional variables, which are important for analyzing cross-
listing effects in cross-sectional research designs.  
5 The Regulatory Quality index measures a government’s ability to implement and formulate sound policies and 
regulations (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home). See Section 1.3 for a more detailed 
explanation.  
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models, I find that, even after controlling for the enforcement environment, the source of the 
deregistration effect appears to be driven by changes in the accounting environment.6  The use of 
IFRS serves as a substitute for a U.S. cross-listing, enabling firms to maintain the same level of 
accounting quality following deregistration from U.S. exchanges.7  
While previous papers have tested the association between IFRS and accounting quality or 
cross-listing and accounting quality, I exploit the unique setting of deregistration from the U.S. to 
connect these streams of literature.  First, deregistration provides a timely and interesting setting 
to examine given the passing of Rule 12h-6, the concern as to the cost of deregistration for 
investors and the growing trend in voluntary deregistrations as compared to new cross-listings in 
recent years (SEC 2007b; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 2010; Karolyi 2012).  Second, this setting 
allows me to separate two of the main drivers of cross-listing effects: U.S. disclosure requirements 
and U.S. regulatory oversight to determine the source of the negative association between 
deregistration and accounting quality.  The setting also allows the analysis to be conducted using 
the firm as its own control, as well as matching the deregistering firm to a non-deregistering firm 
in the same year and country, to mitigate the effect of concurrent changes in home country 
economies and institutions and focus on the impact of the firm’s release from the SEC’s 
jurisdiction on its accounting quality (e.g. Gordon, Jorgensen, and Linthicum 2009).   
While recent literature has argued that changes in enforcement rather than changes in 
accounting standards drive capital market consequences, such as market liquidity, (e.g. Daske, 
Hail, Leuz, and Verdi 2008; Christensen et al. 2013; Brown, Preiato, and Tarca 2014; Leuz and 
                                                          
6 The correlation coefficient between home markets that require IFRS and home markets with high regulatory quality 
is 0.24.  See Section 1.5 for an additional discussion of the correlation between these two variables.  
7 The results are robust to additional analysis which shows the pre-deregistration accounting quality attributes of 
deregistering firms are not significantly different compared to non-deregistering matched firms or between 
deregistering IFRS and deregistering non-IFRS firms. 
                                                                        
7 
 
Wysocki 2015), the setting of my paper focuses on a different question and sample.  First, this 
paper addresses properties of accounting earnings and quality rather than capital market effects.  
Second, I utilize deregistration from the U.S. and not mandatory IFRS adoption as my 
experimental setting.  Lastly, this paper does not analyze changes in home market institutions and 
cross-country regulatory changes, but rather changes in financial reporting caused by leaving the 
SEC’s jurisdiction, and whether these changes, if any, are associated with the level of disclosure 
or enforcement in the home market.   
The properties of accounting earnings examined in this paper have been used in prior 
literature to capture both earnings management and financial reporting quality.  The objective of 
this paper is not to parse out or explicitly test whether changes in the properties of earnings around 
deregistration is being driven by management manipulation or intrinsic quality.  Instead, this paper 
seeks to examine if the reporting of accounting earnings is influenced by deregistration from U.S. 
exchanges.  The separation of these two features of earnings is beyond the scope of this paper.  
This paper extends recent literature on foreign firm deregistrations (Hostak, Lys, Yang, 
and Carr 2013; Li 2014) by examining the impact of IFRS on international cross-listings (e.g. 
Chen, Ng, and Tsang 2015).  Chen et al. (2015) find that following the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS firms from countries requiring IFRS financial statements are more likely to cross-list in other 
countries requiring IFRS and less likely to cross-list in non-IFRS countries (e.g. the U.S).  By 
examining foreign firms’ deregistration rather than listing decisions, my results extend and support 
the notion that the use of IFRS has impacted the market of cross-border listings as foreign firms 
using IFRS maintain the same level of accounting quality in their home markets as when they were 
listed on U.S. exchanges.  As a result, this paper also adds to the literature on the effects of IFRS 
adoption on global financial markets.  
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The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section develops the 
hypotheses. I then discuss the sample selection and research design in Section 1.3. I follow this 
with the main results in Section 1.4 and a discussion of additional analyses in Section 1.5. Finally, 
Section 1.6 concludes the paper. 
1.2 Hypotheses Development 
Doidge et al. (2004) find that firms from countries with poorer accounting standards8 are 
more likely to cross-list in the U.S. because, in doing so, firms can signal to the market that “their 
accounting had been upgraded” (Coffee 2002, 1790).  Coffee argues this change in the information 
environment can be attributed to increased enforcement by the SEC and more stringent disclosure 
requirements in financial reporting.  Similarly, Leuz (2006) argues that the changes that follow 
from a U.S. cross-listing are the result of a combination of legal and market forces.  SEC disclosure 
requirements, such as Form 20-F reconciliations, enable investors and analysts to inspect financial 
information, which allows market forces to reduce the information asymmetry between minority 
shareholders and insiders.   Further, auditors of foreign firms face higher litigation risks in the U.S. 
which can lead to higher audit effort (Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic 2009).9   
This argued increase in oversight and enhanced disclosure has manifested itself in a higher 
accounting quality for U.S. cross-listed firms compared to their matched non-cross-listed peers.  
Cross-listed firms show less evidence of earnings smoothing, report fewer discretionary accruals, 
have a lower tendency to manage earnings towards a target, and recognize losses in a timelier 
manner than their non-cross-listed peers (Lang et al. 2003b).  Corroborating these results, Lang, 
Lins and Miller (2003a) provide evidence that analyst coverage and forecast accuracy increase 
                                                          
8 Their proxy for accounting standards was the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research’s 1991 index 
of accounting standards.   
9 Application of the law has shown that antifraud provisions in the 1934 Securities Act have transnational jurisdiction 
and apply to non-U.S. auditors of cross-listed firms (Seetharaman, Gul, and Lynn 2002). 
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around a U.S. cross-listing and firms’ improved information environments lead to higher 
valuations.  The association between improvements in accounting quality and cross-listing appear 
to be specific to firms subject to SEC rules and disclosures (Level II and III ADRs) and not firms 
cross-listed on the OTC or in other overseas markets (Lang et al. 2003b).10    If deregistration from 
the U.S. releases a firm from the SEC’s jurisdiction, then a firm’s financial reporting environment 
is expected to change.  On the other hand, Lang et al. (2006) find that foreign firms cross-listed in 
the U.S. exhibit more earnings smoothing, a greater tendency to manage earnings towards a target, 
a lower association of earnings with share price, and less timely recognition of losses than U.S. 
firms. They attribute this finding to the relatively high rate of noncompliance with disclosure 
requirements and low rates of SEC disclosure enforcement for cross-listed firms (Frost and 
Pownall 1994).  Following these arguments, if a cross-listed firm is not subject to stringent SEC 
disclosure and enforcement, then deregistration from the U.S. is not expected to significantly 
change a firm’s financial reporting environment.   
Given these arguments as to the relationship between deregistration and accounting quality, 
I state my first hypothesis in null form: 
Hypothesis 1:  There is no association between deregistration and accounting quality.  
Testing this hypothesis enables me to determine the main effect, if any, of deregistration 
on accounting quality.  An issue with analyzing only the main effect is that it does not allow 
determination of the source of the deregistration effect.  Leuz (2003a) argues that prior research 
                                                          
10 Foreign issuers listed in the U.S. are classified into four categories and subject to varying degrees of SEC regulation. 
Level II American Depository Receipts (ADRs) are listed on major U.S. securities exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, 
NASDAQ), but do not involve raising new capital. Level III ADRs involve a public offering of securities in the U.S. 
to raise capital and are listed on major U.S. exchanges.  Both Level II and III ADRs must comply with the full 
registration and reporting requirements of the 1934 Exchange Act and SEC rules.  Level I (OTC) and SEC Rule 144a 
private placements are not subject to the full reporting requirements of the 1934 Exchange Act and disclosure is limited 
to only that required by the firm’s home market (http://www.adrbnymellon.com/).  In this paper, I focus only on Level 
II and III ADRs. 
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has focused on the main or average effect of cross-listing rather than potentially more interesting 
interactive effects of institutional variables or firm characteristics, which are important for 
analyzing cross-listing effects in cross-sectional research designs.  The conclusions I can draw 
from this analysis are made more robust by disentangling the relationship between accounting 
quality and deregistration to determine if the deregistration effects are associated with leaving the 
U.S. disclosure environment or leaving the U.S. regulatory environment (Bailey, Karolyi, and 
Salva 2006; Leuz 2003a).    
The link between cross-listing and accounting disclosure has been examined in prior 
literature.  By comparing Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S. with other cross-listed firms, Leuz 
(2003a) concludes that improvements in forecast accuracy following a U.S. cross-listing can be 
attributed to increased disclosure requirements, as only those firms from countries with lower 
disclosure quality than the U.S. (i.e. non-Canadian firms) experienced improvements in forecast 
accuracy.   Bailey et al. (2006) find that even after controlling for the differences in the level of 
investor protection between the U.S. and foreign firms’ home markets, cross-listed firms from 
countries with better accounting standards experience a more significant increase in volatility 
reactions around earnings announcements.   
Since 1980 the SEC has required foreign firms to reconcile their financial statements to 
U.S. GAAP because “investors’ need for the same type of basic information implies that foreign 
and domestic registrants should be subject to the same disclosure requirements” (SEC 2007c, 12).11  
This reconciliation is aimed at helping investors understand foreign investment opportunities 
“more clearly and with greater comparability than if those issuers disclosed their financial results 
                                                          
11 Before 1980, SEC guidance with respect to financial statements of foreign issuers required only that the “accounting 
principles used by foreign private issuers have authoritative support”.  Annual reports required only a narrative 
description of the differences between foreign accounting principles and U.S. GAAP (SEC 2007c, 11).  
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under a multiplicity of national accounting standards” (SEC 2007c, 25).  However, in the decades 
since the reconciliation requirements were first established, the global accounting landscape has 
significantly changed with the growing use and acceptance of IFRS worldwide.   
Adoption of IFRS has been argued as a mechanism to improve accounting quality because 
it eliminates certain accounting options that were possible under domestic standards, thereby 
reducing managerial discretion (Barth, Landsman, and Lang 2008).  This has increased investors’ 
ability to compare firms across jurisdictions.  These comparability improvements exist even for 
firms with domestic accounting standards similar to IFRS (e.g. the U.K) and firms with high 
information quality before adoption (Brochet, Jagolinzer, and Riedl 2013).  Comparability 
improvements are attributable to both accounting convergence and higher quality information (Yip 
and Young 2012).  Thus, not only does IFRS improve financial reporting quality, but the associated 
enhanced cross-market comparability potentially raises the cost of manipulating earnings for IFRS 
firms.  
Kim, Li, and Li (2012) find that U.S. investors do not perceive cross-listed firms’ IFRS-
based accounting information to be of lower quality relative to that based on U.S. GAAP.  Barth, 
Landsman, Lang, and Williams (2012) find compared to when they applied non-U.S. domestic 
standards, firms’ accounting numbers were more comparable to those of U.S. firms after 
application of IFRS. Leuz (2003b) and Bartov, Goldberg, and Kim (2005) conclude that U.S. 
GAAP and IFRS provide similar information quality and value relevance for German firms. 
The SEC, recognizing the global growth of IFRS and its comparable high-quality with U.S. 
GAAP, enacted an amendment in 2007 allowing the acceptance of IFRS-prepared financial 
statements in SEC filings without reconciliation to U.S. GAAP for cross-listed firms.  In the 
arguments for the final ruling, the SEC stated:  
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“In general, commenters supporting the proposal, which included many foreign private 
issuers, accounting firms, legal firms and foreign standard setters, as well as some 
investors, agreed that IFRS were suitable to be used as an internationally accepted set of 
standards…We believe, based on the staff’s review of IFRS financial statements, that 
financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS as issued by the IASB are of 
sufficient quality” (SEC 2007a). 
 
The acceptance of IFRS-based financial statements in the U.S. shows the belief among regulators, 
standard setters, and investors of the high-quality these financial statements provide.  Norsk 
Hydro’s deregistration announcement cited in the introduction corroborates these arguments as the 
firm believes its home accounting environment will continue to provide investors with high quality 
financial reporting due to the mandated use of IFRS.  If accounting standards and disclosure are a 
source of deregistration effects and IFRS provides comparable quality, then deregistration from 
the U.S. and a return to an IFRS-market is not expected to significantly change a firm’s financial 
reporting quality. 
On the other hand, some studies have argued that there is a negative association between 
IFRS and accounting quality.  Ahmed, Neel, and Wang (2013) find that accounting quality 
decreased after mandatory IFRS adoption, as captured by greater income smoothing, an increase 
in aggressive reporting of accruals, and a decrease in the timely recognition of losses.  Atwood, 
Drake, Myers, and Myers (2011) find that, while IFRS and U.S. GAAP are both high quality 
standards, U.S. GAAP is better with predicting future cash flows. Callao and Jarne (2010) find 
that earnings management has increased in the EU following IFRS adoption, which they argue is 
due to the flexibility the new standards provide to managers compared to domestic standards.  If 
accounting standards and disclosure are a source of deregistration effects, but IFRS does not 
provide comparable quality, then it is uncertain if the use of IFRS is associated with the 
relationship between deregistration and accounting quality. Additionally, prior literature has found 
some evidence that the improvements in accounting quality from a U.S. cross-listing are not being 
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driven by those firms reporting under IAS or U.S. GAAP, and thus, accounting standards per se 
may not play a role in accounting quality changes around cross-listing (Lang et al. 2003b).12  Thus, 
it is not certain whether home market accounting standards and disclosure contribute to 
deregistration effects. 
Given the conflicting evidence from prior literature on the impact of IFRS on accounting 
quality as well as the uncertainty whether accounting standards and disclosure drive deregistration 
effects, it is not clear if accounting standards will impact the relationship between accounting 
quality and deregistration.  I state my next hypothesis in null form: 
Hypothesis 2a: The relationship between accounting quality and deregistration is not 
associated with the use of IFRS. 
The link between increased regulatory quality in the U.S. and cross-listing effects has been 
examined in prior literature.  Hail and Leuz (2009) find that firms cross-listed in the U.S. 
experience a significant decrease in their cost of capital, however, this reduction is smaller for 
firms from countries with stronger legal institutions.  Leuz (2003a) finds that U.S. legal liability 
and SEC enforcement, rather than U.S. disclosure requirements, are the source of cross-listing 
effects for improved analyst coverage of cross-listed firms. Doidge et al. (2004) find that the cross-
listing premium, as proxied by Tobin’s Q, is larger for firms from countries with weaker legal 
enforcement.   
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) discuss the importance of the link 
between a country’s financial accounting environment and its effect on investor protection and 
enforcement of investors’ rights.   Barth et al. (2008) argue that increases in accounting quality 
could follow from a change in accounting standards because of contemporaneous changes in the 
                                                          
12 Lang et al.’s sample period ends in 2001, however, and the early literature on IAS has shown that IAS standards 
have increased in quality over time (Leuz and Verrechia 2000; Holthausen 2003).   
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financial reporting system, such as more stringent enforcement, which limit manager’s discretion 
to opportunistically manage earnings.  Leuz (2006) points out that while cross-listed firms follow 
the same or similar accounting standards as U.S. firms they are still subject to different institutional 
forces in their home markets.  This supports the findings in Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003) that 
institutional factors influence accounting quality.  If regulation is the source of the association 
between deregistration and accounting quality, then it is expected that firms from countries with 
weaker enforcement environments compared to the U.S. will exhibit larger decreases in accounting 
quality following deregistration, while firms from countries with comparable enforcement 
environments will exhibit no significant changes.   
On the other hand, some literature has argued that the link between increased enforcement 
and cross-listing is weak given the relatively little oversight and enforcement by the SEC of cross-
listed firms (Siegel 2005).  Cheng, Srinivasan, and Yu (2014) find that the litigation rate against 
foreign cross-listed firms is significantly lower than that of a matched U.S. sample with similar 
ex-ante litigation risk. They conclude, therefore, that the threat of lawsuits does not restrain 
corporate misreporting for foreign firms as strongly as it does for U.S. firms.   Similarly, 
Srinivasan, Wahid, and Yu (2015) find that the lower number of restatements for cross-listed firms 
compared to U.S. firms is attributable to less stringent monitoring.  If the enforcement of cross-
listed firms in the U.S. is weak, then it is it is not certain whether the level of regulatory quality is 
associated with the relationship between deregistration and accounting quality. 
Given the conflicting evidence from prior literature on the uncertainty whether 
enforcement drives cross-listing effects, it is not clear whether regulatory quality will impact the 
relationship between accounting quality and deregistration.  I state my final hypothesis in null 
form: 
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Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between accounting quality and deregistration is not 
associated with regulatory quality. 
1.3 Sample Selection and Research Design 
 Table 1.1 details the sample composition.  Due to changes in form filing requirements 
during my sample period, I utilize two sources to obtain foreign firm deregistrations. Following 
the enactment of Rule 12h-6 in March 2007, all foreign firm deregistrations are filed under SEC 
Form 15F, as opposed to the earlier SEC Form 15 which contained both foreign and domestic 
deregistrations. Using the Edgar Online I-Metrix database, I collect involuntary and voluntary 
Form 15Fs filed from March 2007 through December 2012.   To collect deregistrations from 2004 
through February 2007 and ensure complete coverage in the Edgar Online I-Metrix database for 
the latter sample period, I utilize the online ADR directories of Bank of New York, Citibank, and 
JP Morgan to obtain all voluntary and involuntary foreign firm deregistrations throughout the 
sample period.13  Involuntary deregistration refers to the removal of a firm from a U.S. exchange 
because of a merger and acquisition, bankruptcy, or violation of listing requirements.  The reason 
for firms’ deregistration is stated either in SEC filings or in an accompanying press release which 
allows me to more clearly distinguish involuntary from voluntary deregistrations.  
The sample period starts in 2004 given wide-spread mandatory adoption of IFRS began in 
2005; ending the sample in 2012 allows me to collect two years of post-deregistration data.  The 
sample is further restricted to ensure only Level II and Level III foreign firm ADRs are included 
as only these types of firms are subject to periodic SEC filings such as the Form 20-F reconciliation 
and I focus only on firms deregistering equity securities. After eliminating firms without sufficient 
data in Worldscope and financial firms, the sample consists of 135 voluntary foreign 
                                                          
13 See adrbnymellon.com, citiadr.idmanagedsolutions.com, and adr.com, respectively. 
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deregistrations. Finally, because Canadian firms cross-listed in the U.S. are not classified as 
“ADRs” and are exempt from the U.S. reporting requirements required of other cross-listed firms, 
consistent with prior literature, Canadian firms are eliminated from the sample. 
The final sample consists of 122 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from 2004 through 
2012. These deregistering firms were cross-listed in the U.S. for an average of 11 years, with 82% 
of the sample coming to the U.S. before 2001, the year the IASB was founded (untabulated). The 
United Kingdom (U.K.), France, and Germany represent the highest number of deregistering firms.  
When examining the breakdown of deregistering firms by year and country, the sample 
composition is consistent with prior studies (e.g. Marosi and Massoud 2008; Doidge et al. 2010; 
Hostak et al. 2013).   
This study examines three measures of accounting quality:  abnormal accruals, loss 
avoidance, and timely loss recognition.  Following prior literature, earnings are considered of 
higher quality if accruals are lower, the probability of reporting a loss is greater, and reporting of 
losses is more timely (e.g. Basu 1997; Jones 1991; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Dechow et al. 
2010).  Leuz (2006) asserts that in order to isolate the effect of cross-listing future research must 
compare the same firm before cross-listing or similar firms in the same country without cross-
listings. Deregistration from the U.S. provides an interesting setting because it allows me to 
conduct multiple levels of analysis. 
First, by comparing accounting quality in the pre- and post-deregistration periods for 
deregistering firms only, I use each firm as its own control, allowing me to focus on changes in 
accounting quality, while controlling for other time-invariant firm and country characteristics.  
Second, I compare accounting quality for deregistering firms to a matched group of non-
deregistering cross-listed firms in the post-deregistration period.  Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006) 
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argue that cross-listed firms are still subject to home country institutions and markets in addition 
to the U.S. environment.  Matching deregistering firms with non-deregistering firms on country, 
year, industry and size14 controls for any concurrent changes in home country institutions and 
economic activities that may confound the results, and as a result isolates the effect of 
deregistration from the U.S.  Additionally, the matched sample models continue to include country, 
year, and industry fixed effects to capture various differences across countries, time, and industries.  
All tests described below are conducted for both the sample of deregistering firms only and the 
matched sample. I collect data from 2001 through 2014 to ensure there are enough firm-year 
observations before and after deregistration to capture the effect of deregistration on accounting 
quality.   Additionally, as the event centers on the year of deregistration, I remove this year from 
my analysis.   
To test hypothesis one, I run all models described below using an indicator variable for 
whether the firm-year observation occurs in the post-deregistration period (PostDereg).  This 
allows me to examine the association between deregistration and accounting quality in general.  
As I am interested in determining the source of the deregistration effect, if any, I next address the 
arguments set forth in Leuz (2003a) and Bailey et al. (2006) of the importance of including 
interactions in cross-listing research designs.15, 16  In doing so, I test if the relationship between 
                                                          
14 I use LnSales to proxy for firm size.  Matching on Sales Growth produces statistically similar results (untabulated).  
15 Leuz (2003a), in discussing and replicating the results of Lang et al. (2003a), sets up a test for cross-listing effects 
on analyst coverage and analyst forecast accuracy using Canadian firms.  He argues that since the Multijurisdictional 
Disclosure System exempts Canadian firms from U.S. reporting requirements this can be interpreted as disclosure 
requirements being comparable between the U.S. and Canada.   However, since SEC enforcement and legal liability 
is more stringent in the U.S., Leuz argues that he can hold disclosure requirements constant in order to isolate the 
effects of U.S. legal liability and SEC enforcement on cross-listed firms.   If extensive disclosure requirements drive 
cross-listing effects, then Canadian firms should experience no changes around U.S. cross-listings.  On the other hand, 
if SEC enforcement and U.S. legal liability drive changes, then even Canadian firms will experience significant cross-
listing effects.  Leuz finds that Canadian firms experience no change in forecast accuracy, and thus, the cross-listing 
effect can be attributed to changes in disclosure.  Conversely, Canadian firms experience a significant increase in 
analyst following leading Leuz to conclude that the source of cross-listing effects differs for following versus accuracy.   
16 Bailey et al. (2006) examine changes in market reactions to earnings announcements around U.S. cross-listings to 
see if there is an association with increased disclosure.  The authors recognize that their findings could falsely be 
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deregistration and accounting quality, if any, can be explained by firms’ home market accounting 
environments or firms’ home market regulatory environments. 
To test hypothesis 2a, I use an indicator variable that captures firms returning to IFRS 
accounting environments (IFRS) and interact it with post-deregistration firm-year observations 
(PostDereg) to examine if the use of IFRS is associated with the relationship, if any, between 
accounting quality and deregistration.  To test hypothesis 2b, I use an indicator variable that 
captures the regulatory quality of firms’ home markets (RegQual) and interact it with post-
deregistration firm-year observations (PostDereg) to examine if regulatory quality in the home 
market is associated with the relationship, if any, between accounting quality and deregistration.   
To measure regulatory quality, I obtain the Regulatory Quality index from the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, a dataset produced by Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2013) covering the time periods and countries in my sample.  This specific index has 
been used extensively in prior literature (e.g. Christensen et al. 2013; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 
2007; Yu and Wahid 2014; Wang 2014).  A key feature of the dataset and methodology is that it 
includes a margin of error for each country’s yearly estimate, which the authors argue needs to be 
taken into account when making comparisons across countries. I utilize the U.S. as the benchmark 
and classify any country-year with an upper-bound percentile rank greater or equal to the U.S.’s 
upper-bound rank (higher ranks indicating greater levels of regulatory quality) as having 
comparable regulatory quality.  As such, I set values of RegQual equal to 1 for these country-year 
observations and 0 otherwise.   
                                                          
associated with increased disclosure when, in fact, it is increased investor protection stemming from U.S. laws and 
enforcement that is driving the results.  In their tests, the authors attempt to disentangle the two effects by separately 
interacting their proxies for accounting standards and enforcement with an indicator variable for post-cross-listing 
years.   
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1.3.1 Abnormal Accruals and Loss Avoidance 
The first measure of accounting quality is abnormal accruals.  Firms have higher earnings 
quality when abnormal accruals are smaller.  I follow Francis et al. (2013) to calculate accruals for 
an international sample.  First, I calculate total accruals (Total_Acc) in year t as earnings before 
extraordinary items less operating cash flows, scaled by total assets in year t-1.  To calculate 
abnormal accruals (Abn_Accruals), I use the modified Jones (1991) model controlling for 
concurrent firm performance (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995; Kothari, Leone, and Wasley 
2005).  Abnormal accruals are the firm-specific residuals from the model of expected accruals; 
higher accounting quality results in smaller abnormal accruals.17 
The next proxy looks at the likelihood of reporting a loss.  Prior literature has argued that 
firms avoid losses by managing earnings.  This has been highlighted in the “kink” in benchmark 
distributions in which a higher proportion of firms report small profits than small losses 
(Burgstahler and Dichev 1997).  It is expected that lower accounting quality is associated with a 
higher likelihood of loss avoidance (i.e. reporting more profits).  This is measured using an 
indicator variable (Loss) that takes the value of 1 if the firm reports negative income before 
extraordinary items in year t and 0 otherwise.    
 The following model is used to test the association between deregistration and accounting 
quality for these two proxies:18 
Abn_Accruals or Prob(Loss) = β0 + β1PostDereg + δControls +  
                                                          
17 Following Francis et al. (2013) I also measure abnormal accruals using Francis and Wang (2008)’s adaption of the 
linear expectation model from DeFond and Park (2001).  Francis and Wang (2008) argue that using the cross-sectional 
Jones (1991) model on an international data set can prove problematic given the potential small number of 
observations.  Assuming accruals have a constant linear relationship over time with sales and gross PPE, the model 
calculates a firm’s expected accruals in year t based on the ratios of current accruals to sales and depreciation expense 
to PPE in year t-1. Abnormal accruals are then calculated as the firm’s actual total accruals in year t less predicted 
accruals in year t.  My results (untabulated) are robust to this alternative measure. 
18 The research design discussed in this section, and the results presented in the following section, are robust to using 
the absolute value of abnormal accruals or total accruals as the dependent variable (untabulated).  
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Fixed or Random Effects + e                                                                                    (1). 
The main variable of interest is PostDereg, an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 for all 
firm-year observations in the periods following deregistration from the U.S. and 0 otherwise.  This 
model is run on a sample that includes only deregistering firms and a matched model of 
deregistering and non-deregistering firms.   
 After first examining hypothesis 1, whether there is an association between deregistration 
and accounting, I then test whether this association is influenced by features of the home market, 
namely the type of accounting standards used by the firm (hypothesis 2a) or the enforcement 
environment (hypothesis 2b).  Equation (1) is expanded as follows: 
Abn_Accruals or Prob(Loss) = β0 + β1PostDereg + β2IFRS + β3PostDereg*IFRS + δControls + 
Fixed or Random Effects + e                                 (2a). 
Abn_Accruals or Prob(Loss) = β0 + β1PostDereg + β2RegQual + β3PostDereg*RegQual +  
δControls + Fixed or Random Effects + e              (2b). 
Lastly, I combine models (2a) and (2b) to simultaneously control for both changes in disclosure 
and changes in enforcement, following the model in Bailey et al. (2006).  
All models include control variables from prior literature that may affect the level of 
abnormal accruals or the likelihood of reporting a loss and are associated with firms’ voluntary 
accounting decisions (Barth et al. 2008).  To control for company size I include the natural 
logarithm of sales (LnSales).  As operating cash flows are associated with the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals (Dechow et al. 1995), I include cash flows from operations scaled by lagged 
total assets (CFO).  Given firms with higher levels of debt may have more incentive to engage in 
earnings management activities to avoid covenant violations I include a control for leverage 
(Leverage).  Prior literature has also found that firms that have already reported losses have fewer 
incentives to manage earnings than firms that report positive earnings (Francis and Yu 2009).  
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Alternatively, the likelihood that a firm reports a loss is expected to increase given they have 
reported a loss in the prior year.  As such, I include an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 
for firms with negative earnings in year t-1 (Lag_Loss) and 0 otherwise.  To control for market 
incentives to manage earnings I use the market-to-book ratio (Market-to-Book).  While this 
captures market based growth, I also include two additional growth measures, Sales_Growth and 
PPE_Growth, both measured as growth from the prior year.  Lastly, when the dependent variable 
is Abn_Accruals I include country, year and industry fixed effects to control for omitted variables 
that could affect firm-level accruals.19  A probit model is run when the dependent variable is Loss, 
and as such I include random effects as opposed to fixed effects to control for omitted variables.  
1.3.2 Timely Loss Recognition 
 The final measure of accounting quality captures the extent to which losses are 
incorporated into earnings.  Prior literature finds that timely loss recognition increases for firms 
after cross-listing in the U.S. (Lang et al. 2003b; Huijgen and Lubberink 2005).  Holthausen (2003) 
argues the traditional Basu (1997) conservatism model is problematic in cross-country studies as 
stock returns may not capture economic income consistently across countries.  Given this issue, I 
follow the model that maps cash flows into accruals from Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) as adapted by Francis et al. (2013).  This approach measures the 
timeliness with which accruals are recognized for those firms with negative relative to positive 
cash flows, with negative cash flows serving as the proxy for economic losses.  Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) argue that timely gain and loss recognition is accomplished through accruals 
as it is based on expected and not realized cash flows.  The following OLS model is run: 
Total_Accruals = β0 + β1PostDereg + β2Neg + β3CFO + β4Neg*PostDereg +  
                                                          
19 I conducted a Hausman (1978) specification test to determine whether to use a random effects or fixed effects model.  
The results, not reported, show that the fixed effects model is a more appropriate estimator.   
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               β5CFO*PostDereg + β6Neg*CFO + β7Neg*CFO*PostDereg + δControls + e          (3), 
where Neg is an indicator variable that equals 1 if cash flows from operations in year t are negative 
and 0 otherwise.  The coefficient of interest is the three-way interaction between Neg, CFO, and 
PostDereg.  Firms with negative cash flows are expected to have more timely recognition of 
accruals relative to firms with positive cash flows, signaling higher accounting quality.  Including 
the three-way interaction term captures the extent to which the relation between timely recognition 
of accruals for negative cash flow firms is affected by deregistration.  A negative coefficient 
indicates less timely recognition and hence, lower accounting quality (Francis et al. 2013).   
 Included in this model are controls for size, leverage, and market-to-book which are 
associated with accounting conservatism.  Each control variable is interacted with Neg and CFO 
separately and in a three-way interaction.  Country, year, and industry fixed effects are also 
included in the models.  As in the other models, I am interested in incorporating an IFRS indicator 
variable and a regulatory quality indicator variable to parse out the source of changes in accounting 
quality following deregistration.  Given the complications of interpreting four-way interactions, I 
instead re-run equation (3) on a sample of firms in which IFRS is equal to one and on a sample of 
firms in which RegQual is equal to one.  If the use of IFRS mitigates the change in accounting 
quality following deregistration, then I expect to find a positive coefficient on the three-way 
interaction term, Neg*CFO*PostDereg, for this subsample.  If a high regulatory quality home 
market mitigates the change in accounting quality following deregistration, then I expect to find a 
positive coefficient on the three-way interaction term, Neg*CFO*PostDereg, for the other 
subsample.  Similar to the earlier tests, I analyze the timely loss recognition measure for a sample 
of deregistering firms only and a sample including matched non-deregistering firms.   
1.4       Results 
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Table 1.2 Panel A presents a univariate analysis of deregistering firms before and after 
deregistration.  As deregistrations can occur at any point in the fiscal year I remove the year of 
deregistration from the analysis.  The number of firm-year observations in which financial 
statements are prepared under IFRS increases in the post-deregistration period, consistent with 
time trends in IFRS adoption.  The RegQuality also increases over the sample period under study, 
which is consistent with concurrent improvements in accounting standards and regulation 
(Christensen et al. 2013).  There is no significant change in deregistering firms’ sales, cash flows 
from operations, or leverage.  Deregistering firms have significantly smaller growth in the post-
deregistration period, as proxied by Sales Growth and PPE Growth.  They also report losses less 
frequently in the post-deregistration period, consistent with lower accounting quality.  Similarly, 
deregistering firms have higher abnormal accruals in the years after deregistration from U.S. 
exchanges, indicating potentially lower accounting quality.  Overall, there appear to be no 
significant changes in firms’ operations between the two time-periods that could be driving 
changes in accounting quality.   
Table 1.2 Panel B presents a univariate analysis of deregistering firms after deregistration 
compared to a matched sample of firms that maintain their cross-listing on U.S. exchanges.20  As 
the samples are matched on country and year, there are no significant differences in the type of 
accounting standards used or the home market regulatory quality.  Similarly, as the firms are 
matched on size and industry, there are no significant differences in most of the firm characteristics 
between the two subsamples.  Non-deregistering firms report losses more frequently, consistent 
                                                          
20 I match first on country and year. To the extent that an exact industry match (2-digit SIC) is not available, which is 
the case for 12 deregistering firm observations, I match the deregistering firm to the two nearest country-year firms in 
terms of size.  Because of this specification, there exist a greater number of firm-year observations for the control 
sample in Table 1.2 Panel B.  The results are robust to excluding those firms without an exact country-year-industry 
match. Additionally, the models include industry-level controls to alleviate any issues with not having an exact 
industry match. 
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with lower accounting quality for deregistering firms.  Similarly, deregistering firms have higher 
abnormal accruals, indicating potentially lower accounting quality.  Overall, the two subsamples 
appear to be balanced allowing me to test the association between deregistration and accounting 
quality.  
1.4.1 Abnormal Accruals 
 I next turn to multivariate tests of accounting quality and deregistration.  The results from 
running a cross-sectional regression of abnormal accruals on the sample of deregistering firms 
only and the matched sample are displayed in Table 1.3 Panels A and B, respectively.  The results 
for testing hypothesis 1 are displayed in the first column (model 1).  This model contains the 
indicator variable PostDereg to capture firm-year observations in the years after deregistration.  
This variable is positive and significant in both Panel A and Panel B.  Firms deregistering from 
the U.S. experience an approximately 0.9% increase in abnormal accruals in the years after 
deregistration compared to both before the firm deregistered and to a sample of firms that maintain 
their U.S. cross-listing.  
Turning to the source of this positive association between deregistration and abnormal 
accruals (negative association between deregistration and accounting quality), model 2a in Panels 
A and B introduces the IFRS variable and interaction term to test hypothesis 2a.  This model also 
controls for the regulatory quality of the home market (RegQuality).  While the indicator 
PostDereg continues to be positive and significant in both Panel A and B, the interaction term 
PostDereg*IFRS is negative and significant.  An F-test of the sum of the coefficients on PostDereg 
and PostDereg*IFRS (0.006 in both Panels) shows that I cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum 
of the coefficients equals zero.  Thus, IFRS firms experience no significant change in abnormal 
accruals following deregistration and the increase in abnormal accruals is attributable to those 
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firms returning to non-IFRS home markets.  While abnormal accruals are higher for deregistering 
firm-years, this relationship is mitigated by high-quality accounting in the home market.   
To examine the other potential source of deregistration effects (hypothesis 2b), in model 
2b I interact RegQuality with PostDereg which captures firms returning to a regulatory 
environment comparable to the U.S. while also controlling for the use of IFRS.  In both Panels A 
and B I find that the interaction with RegQuality is not significant.  Thus, the regulatory quality in 
the home market is not associated with the relationship between deregistration and abnormal 
accruals.   
Finally, I combine models 2a and 2b to control for both the accounting environment and 
regulatory environment in the home market post-deregistration (model 3).  In model 3 in Panels A 
and B, I continue to find a positive association between abnormal accruals and deregistration.  Both 
panels also show this positive association is mitigated by the use of IFRS.  The sum of PostDereg 
and PostDereg*IFRS in both panels (0.002 and 0.004, respectively) is not significantly different 
from zero, showing that IFRS firms experience no significant change in the level of abnormal 
accruals around deregistration from the U.S.  The insignificant coefficient on 
PostDereg*RegQuality in both panels shows that the source of the deregistration effect appears to 
be a change in the accounting and disclosure environments for cross-listed firms.  In addition, the 
signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on the control variables remain the same across all four 
specifications and both panels.  Larger firms tend to have larger abnormal accruals, while CFO, 
Leverage, and Lag Loss are all negatively associated with abnormal accruals.  
1.4.2 Loss Avoidance 
 The next proxy for accounting quality is the probability of reporting a loss.  Table 1.4 
Panels A and B presents the results for a probit model analyzing the sample of deregistering firms 
only and matched non-deregistering firms, respectively.  The model specifications are the same as 
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in the accruals analysis.  Model 1 tests hypothesis 1 by examining the association between the 
probability of reporting a loss and deregistration from the U.S.  In both panels, I find that 
deregistering firms are significantly less likely to report losses compared to both before 
deregistration and to non-deregistering firms.   
 In model 2a, the coefficient on PostDereg*IFRS is positive and significant in both panels.  
In Panel A and B, a Wald test shows the sum of the coefficients on PostDereg and PostDereg*IFRS 
(-0.229 and 0.027, respectively) is insignificantly different from zero.  While deregistration 
decreases the probability that a non-IFRS firm will report a loss, it results in no significant change 
for IFRS firms.  In model 2b, I test hypothesis 2b to determine if the source of the negative 
association between deregistration and accounting quality is mitigated by the high regulatory 
quality in the home market.  I find insignificant results in both panels, indicating that the 
relationship between deregistration and accounting quality is not associated with the regulatory 
quality of the home market.   
 Model 3 combines both models 2a and 2b and the results continue to show that even after 
controlling for differences in the regulatory environments between the U.S. and home markets, 
differences in accounting standards remains a significant factor in explaining changes in 
accounting quality for deregistering firms.  Again, a Wald test shows the sum of the coefficients 
on PostDereg and PostDereg*IFRS (-0.082 and -0.228, respectively) is insignificantly different 
from zero.  Additionally, across both panels and all specifications, the probability of reporting a 
loss is less likely for larger firms (LnSales) and firms with higher cash flows from operations 
(CFO).  Consistent with prior literature, the probability of reporting a loss is higher for firms with 
higher leverage (Leverage) and those with prior period losses (Lag_Loss).  
1.4.3 Timely Loss Recognition 
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 The final accounting quality proxy examined is timely loss recognition.  As discussed in 
Section 1.3, my interest in this analysis is the coefficient on the interaction term 
Neg*CFO*PostDereg  which captures the timeliness of recording total accruals for firms with 
negative cash flows following deregistration from the U.S. (Francis et al. 2013).  Table 1.5 Panel 
A and B details the analysis for the sample of deregistering firms only and the sample of 
deregistering firms and matched non-deregistering firms, respectively.  Model 1 is run on the full 
samples in each setting.  The results show a negative and significant coefficient on the three-way 
interaction term in both panels, which indicates total accruals are recorded in a less timely manner 
for firms with negative cash flows in post-deregistration years compared to pre-deregistration 
years and their matched non-deregistering peers.  Thus, accounting quality is lower following 
deregistration.   
 As in the earlier tests, I am interested in determining the source of the negative association 
between deregistration and accounting quality.  However, rather than including four-way 
interactions in the model with not only the variables of interest, but also all control variables, I 
instead re-run model 1 on a subsample of firms that use IFRS.  In doing so, I test if IFRS mitigates 
the negative relationship between deregistration and accounting quality (hypothesis 2a).  model 2a 
in both panels shows that for IFRS firms only, the interaction term Neg*CFO*PostDereg is now 
significantly positive, which provides evidence that accruals are recorded more timely for 
deregistering firms with negative cash flows that use IFRS and thus, the source of the deregistration 
effect appears to be a change in firms’ accounting environments following deregistration from the 
U.S.    
 The final model in the panels re-runs model 1 on the subsample of firms with high 
regulatory quality home markets (RegQuality equal to one) to test hypothesis 2b.  The coefficient 
                                                                        
28 
 
on the interaction term is negative and insignificant in both panels, indicating that home market 
regulatory quality does not impact the association between deregistration and timely recognition.   
Overall, the three models in Panel A show that accounting quality is lower for deregistering firms 
after leaving U.S markets, but this negative association is mitigated by the use of IFRS in firms’ 
home markets.  
To summarize my main results, I find that there is a significant decrease in accounting 
quality after deregistration from the U.S.  Deregistering firms have higher abnormal accruals, are 
less likely to report a loss, and have less timely recognition of accruals when cash flows are 
negative, compared to before the firm deregistered and to a matched group of non-deregistering 
firms.  Further, when controlling for the home market accounting environment, I find this decrease 
in accounting quality is not significant for firms returning to home markets that require IFRS, but 
rather the significant decrease is attributable only to foreign firms returning to non-IFRS 
environments. On the other hand, when controlling for the regulatory environment in the home 
market, I find the negative association between deregistration and accounting quality is not 
mitigated by home markets with higher regulatory quality.  When including both interactions in 
the same model, I find that even after controlling for the enforcement environment the source of 
deregistration effects appears to be driven by changes in accounting standards.  
1.5       Additional Analyses 
To ensure the results presented thus far are not influenced by the measures of accounting 
quality selected, I conduct additional tests using alternative proxies.  Following prior literature, I 
use two measures of earnings smoothing (e.g. Leuz et al. 2003; Lang et al. 2003b; Lang et al. 2006; 
Barth et al. 2008).  The first captures the extent insiders reduce the variability of reported earnings 
by manipulating accruals in order to conceal changes in a firm’s performance.  It is measured as 
the ratio of the standard-deviation of operating earnings divided by the standard deviation of cash 
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flow from operations; lower values of this ratio indicate insiders use accounting discretion to 
smooth reported earnings (Leuz et al. 2003).  The second captures the extent to which insiders use 
accruals to hide economic shocks to a firm’s operating cash flow.  It is measured as the correlation 
between changes in accruals and operating cash flows.  Larger negative correlations indicate a 
smoothing of earnings that does not reflect a firm’s underlying economic performance (Leuz et al. 
2003). 
Table 1.6 and 1.7 present the results of these measures for the sample of deregistering firms 
only and matched deregistering and non-deregistering firms, respectively.  Panel A in both tables 
compares the full samples under study, without separating by IFRS or RegQual.  Both tables show 
the negative relationship between deregistration and accounting quality persists using these 
proxies.  The significantly lower variability of earnings relative to cash flows and the significantly 
larger negative correlation between changes in accruals and cash flows shows a higher tendency 
to smooth reported earnings for deregistering firms.   
Panels B and C in both tables split the sample by the main variables of interest from the 
tests of hypothesis 2a and 2b.  Table 1.6 illustrates that non-IFRS firms show significantly 
smoother earnings following deregistration than IFRS firms, while there is no significant 
difference between the two groups before deregistration.  Table 1.7 Panel B corroborates this 
finding that non-IFRS deregistering firms show significantly more earnings smoothing after 
deregistration than matched non-deregistering firms.  Both tables show that splitting the sample 
on RegQual results in no significant changes for firms following deregistration.  Thus, the 
alternative accounting quality proxies in these tables confirm the earlier reported results.   
Another concern with this research design is that deregistering firms may exhibit 
differences in accounting quality in the post-deregistration period compared to non-deregistering 
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firms because their accounting quality in the pre-deregistration period is also different. Similarly, 
the results for the differences in accounting quality for IFRS compared to non-IFRS users may be 
driven by pre-deregistration differences.  In order to attribute post-deregistration differences in 
accounting quality to deregistration from the U.S. and changes in financial reporting for non-IFRS 
firms, I need to compare pre-deregistration accounting quality.  Finding that accounting quality is 
similar for deregistering and non-deregistering firms and IFRS and non-IFRS deregistering firms 
in the pre-deregistration period, but not in the post-deregistration period would make it less likely 
that differences in accounting quality following deregistration are attributable to differences in 
economic characteristics between the groups (Barth et al. 2008).    
To test this, I examine accounting quality using only pre-deregistration firm-year 
observations.  In untabulated results, I find no significant relationship between IFRS or RegQuality 
and accounting quality in the pre-deregistration period.  My main test results thus appear to pick 
up the effects of deregistration from the U.S. and not underlying differences in deregistering firms’ 
financial reporting characteristics before and after deregistration. Additionally, I compare 
(untabulated) the accounting quality of the deregistering firms and their matched peers in the pre-
deregistration period only and find that there is no significant difference in the accounting quality 
for deregistering firms before deregistration compared to a matched group of non-deregistering 
firms. This analysis allows to me conclude that differences in accounting quality between 
deregistering firms and non-deregistering firms before deregistration from the U.S. does not 
account for the post-deregistration difference supporting the results of my main analysis.  
Another concern is that there is a fundamental difference in the types of firms that 
deregistered before and after Rule 12h-6.  Though the rule only changed the requirements to be 
met for deregistration and not the type of firms that could deregister, it is possible my results are 
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influenced by the time period under study.  I repeat the procedures described in the previous section 
on two separate subsamples of firms that deregistered before and after the March 2007 ruling, as 
well as by including an indicator variable in the full sample tests for whether the firm deregistered 
in the post-Rule12h-6 period.  Under both sets of analysis (untabulated), I find no significant 
change in the earlier reported results regardless of the separate time periods under study.  
Deregistration from the U.S. continues to be associated with a decrease in accounting quality; 
however, the use of IFRS in the home market (and not regulatory quality) mitigates this 
relationship.  
Lastly, it remains a methodological issue whether countries simultaneously adopt IFRS 
and improve regulatory quality. I separate the two effects by examining changes in a country’s 
Regulatory Quality Index around the mandatory IFRS adoption year, if applicable.  I find that on 
average, the Regulatory Quality Index decreases 0.02 points in the year following IFRS adoption 
(the Index ranges from -2.5 [weak] to 2.5 [strong] governance).  In terms of my indicator variable 
classification (as described above), I find that one country (Chile) experienced a decrease in 
regulatory quality compared to the U.S. in the year following mandatory IFRS adoption 
(RegQuality changed from 1 to 0), while there were no other changes in classification for the 
remaining countries.  This analysis shows that the two variables capture different dimensions of 
the home market.   
1.6       Conclusion 
Given SEC regulations loosening the requirements for foreign firms to leave the U.S. and 
the subsequent spike in deregistrations, in this paper I analyze 122 foreign firms that voluntarily 
deregistered from the U.S. from 2004 through 2012.  Prior literature has attributed cross-listing 
effects such as increased accounting quality, analyst following, accuracy, valuation, etc. to the 
increased accounting disclosure environment in the U.S., as well as the increased regulatory 
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enforcement.  Addressing the arguments in prior literature as to the importance of separating these 
effects, I study the association between deregistration and accounting quality and test whether 
foreign firms’ home market accounting or regulatory environments impact this association (Leuz 
2003a).  
First, I find that deregistration from the U.S. is associated with a significant increase in 
abnormal accruals, a lower probability of reporting a loss, and less timely loss recognition, 
compared to both before the firm deregistered and to a matched sample of non-deregistering firms.  
Next, I conduct tests to determine the source of this negative association between deregistration 
and accounting quality.  Given the proliferation of IFRS in recent years and the SEC’s acceptance 
of IFRS-prepared financial statements of foreign issuers, I use IFRS as a proxy for home market 
accounting environments that are similar to the U.S.  After introducing this variable into the 
research design and interacting it with post-deregistration firm-year observations, I find that the 
decrease in accounting quality after deregistration is mitigated by the use of IFRS and is 
attributable only to those firms returning to non-IFRS home markets.  While these results show 
that changes in firms’ accounting environments appears to drive the deregistration effect, I also 
conduct tests to control for the regulatory quality in the home market.  I utilize the World Bank’s 
Regulatory Quality index to identify firm-year observations in which home markets provided 
comparable or better regulatory quality than the U.S. and use this variable to proxy for home 
market regulatory quality.  However, tests using this regulatory quality proxy and interacting it 
with post-deregistration firm-year observations produce no significant results across all three 
accounting quality proxies.  My final analysis combines the tests described and simultaneously 
controls for the home market accounting and regulatory environments. By separately including 
interactions of post-cross-listing firm-year observations with proxies for disclosure and 
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enforcement, I show that even after controlling for differences in the regulatory environments 
between the U.S. and home markets, differences in home market accounting environments remains 
a significant factor in explaining changes in accounting quality for deregistering firms (Bailey et 
al. 2006).   
This paper exploits the unique setting of deregistration from the U.S.  It addresses Leuz 
(2003a)’s suggestion that cross-listing studies should try to separate the cross-sectional variation 
in listing effects by adding interactive effects with institutional variables or firm characteristics.  
By separating the two main drivers of cross-listing effects, U.S. disclosure requirements and U.S. 
regulatory oversight, I determine the source of the negative association between deregistration and 
accounting quality.  While there is self-selection involved in the decision to voluntary deregister 
from the U.S., the setting allows me to conduct multiple levels of analysis to ensure I am capturing 
post-deregistration effects only. I use the firm as its own control, as well as match the deregistering 
firm to a non-deregistering firm in the same year and country, to mitigate the effect of concurrent 
changes in home country economies and institutions and focus on the impact of the firm’s release 
from the SEC’s jurisdiction on its accounting quality (Gordon et al. 2009).  The main results are 
robust to additional analysis which shows the pre-deregistration accounting quality attributes of 
deregistering firms are not significantly different compared to non-deregistering matched firms or 
between deregistering IFRS and deregistering non-IFRS firms before deregistration.  
The results in this paper extend and support the notion that the use of IFRS has impacted 
the market of cross-border listings as foreign firms using IFRS maintain the same level of 
accounting quality in their home markets as when they were listed on U.S. exchanges (e.g. Chen 
et al. 2015).  Differences in home market accounting environments are a significant factor in 
explaining changes in accounting quality for firms deregistering from the U.S.  This study is of 
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importance to regulators and investors as it shows the potential costs to investors (a decrease in 
financial reporting quality) stemming from deregistration from the U.S. and the types of home 
markets that offset this effect. 
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Figure 1.1: Number of foreign firms listed on major U.S. exchanges 2004-2012 
 
This figure plots the number of foreign listings on major U.S. stock exchanges (AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE) from 
2004 to 2012.  The data for each year are taken from the December reports published by the World Federation of 
Exchanges, which has been used extensively in cross-listing literature (e.g. Karolyi 2012; Fernandes and Gianetti 
2013; Sarkissian and Schill 2014). 
 
Figure 1.2: Number of new cross-listings and deregistrations on major U.S. exchanges 2004-2012 
 
This figure plots the number of new cross-listings on major U.S. stock exchanges (AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE) 
from 2004 to 2012 and the number of deregistrations from major U.S. stock exchanges over the same time period.  
The data for each year obtained from the online ADR directories of Bank of New York, Citibank, and JP Morgan 
Chase. 
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Table 1.1:Sample composition   
 Panel A: Voluntary foreign firm deregistrations 2004-2012 
Edgar Online I-Metrix Form 15F filings of voluntary & involuntary deregistrations             412  
Bank of New York's, CitiBank's, & JP Morgan's internet ADR directories of 
terminations             352  
Duplicates between two listings           (309) 
Amendment to previously filed Form 15F             (21) 
Firms incorporated in US             (43) 
Firm listed on OTC only, never sold securities in the US             (84) 
Deregistration due to merge & acquisition             (42) 
Delisted by the exchange for violating listing standards               (8) 
Deregistered debt securities only             (75) 
Missing data in Worldscope             (35) 
Financial firms             (12) 
Canadian firms             (13) 
Full Sample            122  
This panel reports how the final sample of 122 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from the U.S. was obtained.  I 
collected Form 15F filings of all foreign firm deregistrations from the Edgar Online I-Metrix database. I supplemented 
this with listings of terminated ADR programs on Bank of New York, Citibank, and JP Morgan’s websites.  I removed 
any duplicates between the four sources of deregistering foreign firms.  I further restricted the sample by eliminating 
any firms incorporated in the U.S.  The population of Form 15F filings obtained from Edgar contained some 
amendments to previously filed Form 15F’s and as such are excluded.  I removed firms that were listed on the OTC 
only to limit my sample to firms required to regularly file with the SEC.  Involuntary deregistrations are those due to 
merger and acquisitions or violations of listing standards. I also exclude those firms that deregistered debt securities 
only.  Finally, I exclude financial firms, firms without sufficient data in Worldscope, and Canadian firms. 
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Panel B: Sample by year and country 
Voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from the U.S. by Year 
2004 5     
2005 8     
2006 12     
2007 51     
2008 14     
2009 13     
2010 7     
2011 8     
2012 4     
 122     
 
Voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from the U.S. by country (with mandatory IFRS adoption year) 
AUSTRALIA (2005) 5 MEXICO (2012) 3 
AUSTRIA (2005) 1 NETHERLANDS (2005) 8 
BELGIUM (2005) 1 NEW ZEALAND (2007) 1 
CHILE (2009) 3 NORWAY (2005) 3 
FINLAND (2005) 3 PHILIPPINES (2007) 1 
FRANCE (2005) 15 PORTUGAL (2005) 1 
GERMANY (2005) 15 SINGAPORE (n/a) 2 
HONG KONG (2005) 5 SOUTH AFRICA (2005) 1 
HUNGARY (2005) 1 SPAIN (2005) 1 
INDIA (n/a) 1 SWEDEN (2005) 3 
ISRAEL (2008) 4 SWITZERLAND (n/a) 4 
ITALY (2005) 4 TAIWAN (2013) 1 
JAPAN (n/a) 7 UNITED KINGDOM (2005) 23 
KOREA (SOUTH) (2011) 2 VENEZUELA (2007) 1 
LUXEMBOURG (2005) 2    
      122 
This panel breaks down the 122 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations by year and country. Next to each country is 
the year of mandatory IFRS adoption within the jurisdiction, if applicable.  
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics                  
Panel A: Deregistering firms pre- v. post-deregistration           
  
Deregistering:  
Pre-Deregistration   
Deregistering:  
Post-Deregistration   
  N Mean Median   N Mean   Median   
IFRS 783 0.621 1.000  716 0.707 *** 1.000 *** 
RegQuality 783 0.449 0.000  716 0.626 *** 1.000 *** 
Ln(Sales) 760 22.090 22.417  643 22.161  22.528  
CFO 671 0.089 0.087  637 0.089  0.086  
Leverage 763 0.587 0.590  614 0.576  0.567  
Sales Growth 668 0.118 0.057  642 0.063 *** 0.028 *** 
PPE Growth 671 0.093 0.039  641 0.056 ** 0.037  
Loss 762 0.273 0.000  642 0.224 ** 0.000 ** 
Market-to-Book 722 61.775 1.853  631 58.602  1.968  
Abn_Accruals 668 0.010 0.012   610 0.015 ** 0.015 * 
This panel details the characteristics of the 122 foreign firms that voluntary deregistered from U.S. exchanges from 
2004-2012.  Deregistering firms are compared in the years before deregistration to the years after deregistration, with 
the year of deregistration removed from the analysis.  All firm-level data are obtained from Worldscope, except as 
noted below. All statistics are presented for firm-year observations.  IFRS is an indicator variable coded 1 for firm-
years in which financial statements are prepared according to IFRS and 0 otherwise.  RegQuality is obtained using the 
World Banks’s Regulatory Quality Index. Firm-year observations with upper-bound percentile ranks of regulatory 
quality greater than or equal to the U.S.’s upper-bound rank are coded 1, and 0 otherwise. Ln(Sales) is the natural 
logarithm of total sales. CFO is cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets. Leverage is total debt divided 
by total assets.  Sales Growth is measured as growth in sales from the prior year.  PPE Growth is measured as the 
growth in property, plant, and equipment from the prior year.  Loss is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 
for firm-year observations with negative earnings, and 0 otherwise. Market-to-Book is calculated as the fiscal year end 
stock price times the number of common shares outstanding divided by total shareholders’ equity. Abn_Accruals is 
defined as the firm-specific residual from equation (1). ***, **, and * indicate that deregistering firms’ characteristics 
before deregistration are significantly different from their characteristics after deregistration at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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 Panel B: Deregistering firms v. matched non-deregistering firms         
  
Deregistering Firm:  
Post-Deregistration   
Non-Deregistering Firm:  
Matched on Year-Nation-Industry 
  N Mean Median   N Mean   Median   
IFRS 716 0.707 1.000   836 0.738  1.000  
RegQuality 716 0.626 1.000  836 0.697  1.000  
Ln(Sales) 643 22.161 22.528  836 22.791  22.482  
CFO/Assets 637 0.089 0.086  790 0.098 * 0.089  
Leverage 614 0.576 0.567  804 0.572  0.059  
Sales Growth 642 0.063 0.028  782 0.072  0.030  
PPE Growth 641 0.056 0.037  782 0.097 *** 0.070 *** 
Loss 642 0.224 0.000  836 0.283 ** 0.000 ** 
Market-to-Book 631 58.602 1.968  795 63.676 ** 1.706 ** 
Abn_Accruals 610 0.015 0.015   782 -0.008 *** 0.001 *** 
This panel compares the characteristics of foreign firms after deregistration from U.S. exchanges with a matched 
sample of foreign firms that continue to maintain a U.S. cross-listing.  The match is conducted at the year-nation-2 
digit SIC industry level and then the closest firm in terms of size (LnAssets). To the extent that an exact industry match 
(2-digit SIC) is not available, which is the case for 12 deregistering firm observations, I match the deregistering firm 
to the two nearest country-year firms in terms of size.  Because of this specification, there exist a greater number of 
firm-year observations for the control sample.  All variables are as defined in Panel A.   ***, **, and * indicate that 
the characteristics of deregistering firms after leaving the U.S. differ significantly from the characteristics of non-
deregistering firms that maintain a U.S. cross-listing at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.    
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Table 1.3: Abnormal accruals 
Panel A: Deregistering firms only: pre-deregistration v. post-deregistration   
  Abn_Accruals Abn_Accruals Abn_Accruals Abn_Accruals 
  (1) (2a) (2b) (3) 
PostDereg      0.011**      0.030*** 0.007       0.029*** 
 (2.02) (2.98) (1.07) (2.77) 
IFRS  0.009 -0.002 0.011 
  (1.27) (0.33) (1.39) 
PostDereg*IFRS     -0.024**      -0.027** 
  (2.28)  (2.58) 
RegQuality  0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.34) 
PostDereg*RegQuality   0.006 0.009 
   (1.08) (1.60) 
Ln(Sales)     0.004**    0.004**     0.004**     0.004** 
 (2.53) (2.47) (2.50) (2.50) 
CFO      -0.360***     -0.347***      -0.349***     -0.347*** 
 (10.25) (9.77) (9.77) (9.84) 
Leverage      -0.043***     -0.044***      -0.044***     -0.044*** 
 (3.46) (3.54) (3.51) (3.58) 
Sales Growth 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.24) (0.22) (0.25) (0.25) 
PPE Growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) 
Market-to-Book 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.25) (0.44) (0.39) (0.41) 
Lag Loss -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (1.59) (1.23) (1.27) (1.17) 
Intercept     0.061**      0.067***       0.067***       0.067*** 
 (2.41) (2.63) (2.63) (2.63) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 
N 1,179 1,179 1,179 1,179 
In this panel deregistering firms are compared before and after deregistration.  The dependent variable in the OLS 
regression is Abn_Accruals as defined in Table 1.2 Panel A.  PostDereg is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of 1 for all firm-year observations after deregistration from the U.S. and 0 otherwise.  All other variables are as defined 
in Table 1.2 Panel A.  The t-statistics are listed in parenthesis below the coefficients. They are adjusted for clustering 
on firms.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 1.3: Abnormal accruals 
Panel B: Deregistering firms v. matched non-deregistering firms 
  Abn_Accruals Abn_Accruals Abn_Accruals Abn_Accruals 
  (1) (2a) (2b) (3) 
PostDereg 0.007** 0.033** 0.005 0.031** 
 (2.01) (2.47) (1.30) (2.30) 
IFRS  0.001 0.000 0.001 
  (0.14) (0.05) (0.15) 
PostDereg*IFRS  -0.027**  -0.027** 
  (2.04)  (2.00) 
RegQuality  -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  (1.29) (1.28) (1.34) 
PostDereg*RegQuality   0.003 0.002 
   (0.56) (0.44) 
Ln(Sales) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (4.33) (4.34) (4.31) (4.32) 
CFO -0.389*** -0.388*** -0.389*** -0.388*** 
 (15.38) (15.11) (15.21) (15.13) 
Leverage -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.038*** 
 (3.63) (3.67) (3.61) (3.67) 
Sales Growth 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 (1.31) (1.29) (1.33) (1.31) 
PPE Growth 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 
 (2.22) (2.25) (2.24) (2.25) 
Market-to-Book 0.000* 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 
 (1.96) (2.01) (1.71) (1.83) 
Lag Loss -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (5.83) (5.66) (5.79) (5.66) 
Intercept -0.018* -0.014 -0.016 -0.015 
 (1.73) (1.31) (1.40) (1.32) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 
N 1,390 1,390 1,390 1,390 
In this panel deregistering firms are compared after deregistration to a matched sample of non-deregistering cross-
listed firms.  The dependent variable in the OLS regression is Abn_Accruals as defined in Table 1.2 Panel A.  
PostDereg is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for all firm-year observations after deregistration from the 
U.S. and 0 otherwise.  All other variables are as defined in Table 1.2 Panel A.  The t-statistics are listed in parenthesis 
below the coefficients. They are adjusted for clustering on firms.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 1.4: Loss avoidance 
Panel A: Deregistering firms only: pre-deregistration v. post-deregistration 
  Prob(Loss) Prob(Loss) Prob(Loss) Prob(Loss) 
  (1) (2a) (2b) (3) 
PostDereg    -0.519**    -1.236** -0.280    -1.177** 
 (2.06) (2.26) (0.78) (2.11) 
IFRS  -0.208 0.235 -0.246 
  (0.57) (0.69) (0.66) 
PostDereg*IFRS         1.007**          1.095**    
  (1.99)  (1.97) 
RegQuality  -0.386 -0.298 -0.297 
  (1.43) (1.02) (1.01) 
PostDereg*RegQuality   -0.128 -0.225 
   (0.49) (0.82) 
Ln(Sales) -0.153*** -0.172**   -0.170**   -0.172**   
 (4.35) (2.48) (2.48) (2.49) 
CFO -12.479*** -17.493***  -17.314***  -17.562***  
 (6.88) (6.05) (6.03) (6.06) 
Leverage 1.161*** 1.503***   1.488***   1.514***   
 (3.18) (3.20) (3.20) (3.18) 
Sales Growth 0.020 0.330 0.300 0.313 
 (0.08) (1.51) (1.34) (1.40) 
PPE Growth 0.247 0.440 0.436 0.447 
 (0.66) (0.98) (0.98) (0.99) 
Lag Loss 0.630*** 0.260* 0.278** 0.260*    
 (4.35) (1.83) (1.96) (1.84) 
Market-to-Book -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.10) (0.27) (0.30) (0.29) 
Intercept 1.448*** 2.151*** 2.108*** 2.127*** 
 (2.90) (3.09) (3.02) (3.06) 
Pseudo R2 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.50 
N 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 
In this panel deregistering firms are compared before and after deregistration.  The dependent variable in the probit 
regression is Loss as defined in Table 1.2 Panel A.  PostDereg is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for all 
firm-year observations after deregistration from the U.S. and 0 otherwise.  All other variables are as defined in Table 
1.2 Panel A.  The z-statistics are listed in parenthesis below the coefficients.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 1.4: Loss avoidance 
Panel B: Deregistering firms v. matched non-deregistering firms 
  Prob(Loss) Prob(Loss) Prob(Loss) Prob(Loss) 
  (1) (2a) (2b) (3) 
PostDereg   -0.245* -0.792** -0.246 -1.018** 
 (1.82) (2.16) (1.06) (2.33) 
IFRS  -0.247* -0.206 -0.222 
  (1.67) (1.38) (1.45) 
PostDereg*IFRS  0.819**  0.790** 
  (2.23)  (2.11) 
RegQuality  0.235* 0.141 0.146 
  (1.76) (0.89) (0.91) 
PostDereg*RegQuality   -1.590 -1.600 
   (1.43) (1.46) 
Ln(Sales) -0.152*** -0.097*** -0.095*** -0.095*** 
 (3.40) (3.08) (2.99) (2.99) 
CFO -9.000*** -8.227*** -8.297*** -8.299*** 
 (5.54) (6.12) (6.14) (6.13) 
Leverage 1.340*** 1.008*** 1.016*** 1.026*** 
 (3.31) (3.00) (3.01) (3.04) 
Sales Growth 0.426 -0.066 -0.040 -0.039 
 (1.28) (0.20) (0.12) (0.12) 
PPE Growth 0.396 0.158 0.173 0.169 
 (0.74) (0.29) (0.32) (0.31) 
Lag Loss 0.900*** 0.946*** 0.943*** 0.941*** 
 (6.10) (7.38) (7.31) (7.31) 
Market-to-Book 0.000 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.27) (3.77) (4.31) (4.37) 
Intercept 1.036* 0.462 0.458 0.457 
 (1.73) (1.07) (1.05) (1.05) 
Pseudo R2 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.37 
N 1,392 1,392 1,392 1,392 
In this panel deregistering firms are compared after deregistration to a matched sample of non-deregistering cross-
listed firms.  The dependent variable in the probit regression is Loss as defined in Table 1.2 Panel A.  PostDereg is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for all firm-year observations after deregistration from the U.S. and 0 
otherwise.  All other variables are as defined in Table 1.2 Panel A.  The z-statistics are listed in parenthesis below the 
coefficients.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 1.5: Timely loss recognition 
Panel A: Deregistering firms only: pre-deregistration years v. post-deregistration years 
  Full Sample IFRS firms only 
High RegQuality 
firms only 
 Total_Accruals Total_Accruals Total_Accruals 
  (1) (2a) (2b) 
Neg*CFO*PostDereg -0.200* 0.224* -0.089 
 (1.73) (1.66) (0.42) 
Neg*PostDereg -0.035* 0.012 -0.001 
 (1.83) (0.48) (0.03) 
CFO*PostDereg -0.111** -0.219*** -0.036 
 (2.09) (2.87) (0.46) 
PostDereg 0.022** 0.032** 0.006 
 (2.08) (2.54) (0.37) 
Neg*CFO 0.151 0.971** 0.921 
 (0.54) (2.23) (1.43) 
Neg -0.028 -0.091* -0.012 
 (0.64) (1.86) (0.18) 
CFO 0.448** 0.617*** 1.062*** 
 (2.40) (2.73) (4.14) 
Ln(Sales) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 
 (5.15) (4.46) (5.14) 
Neg*Ln(Sales) 0.005 0.009** 0.001 
 (1.47) (2.34) (0.17) 
CFO*Ln(Sales) -0.035*** -0.050*** -0.091*** 
 (2.63) (2.92) (4.61) 
Neg*CFO*Ln(Sales) 0.046* 0.090* 0.064 
 (1.95) (1.95) (0.90) 
Leverage -0.032** -0.036** -0.034* 
 (2.05) (2.03) (1.74) 
Neg*Leverage -0.175*** -0.156*** -0.084 
 (4.24) (2.95) (1.20) 
CFO*Leverage -0.379*** -0.200* -0.131 
 (5.07) (1.94) (1.21) 
Neg*CFO*Leverage -0.197 -0.411 0.282 
 (1.06) (1.55) (0.58) 
Market-to-Book 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
 (3.87) (4.04) (0.71) 
Neg*Market-to-Book 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 
 (0.62) (1.68) (0.02) 
CFO*Market-to-Book -0.000* -0.000** 0.000 
 (1.66) (2.13) (0.79) 
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Neg*CFO*Market-to-Book 0.001* -0.001 0.000 
 (1.79) (0.69) (0.07) 
Intercept -0.162*** -0.190*** -0.192*** 
 (5.36) (5.57) (4.87) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.72 0.71 0.73 
N 1,307 802 780 
In this panel deregistering firms are compared before and after deregistration.  The dependent variable in the OLS 
regression is Total_Accruals is earnings before extraordinary items less operating cash flows, scaled by lagged total 
assets.  PostDereg is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for all firm-year observations after deregistration 
from the U.S. and 0 otherwise. Neg is an indicator variable that equals 1 if cash flows from operations in year t are 
negative and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Table 1.2 Panel A.  The t-statistics are listed in 
parenthesis below the coefficients. They are adjusted for clustering on firms.   ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
  
                                                                        
46 
 
Table 1.5: Timely loss recognition 
Panel B: Deregistering firms v. matched non-deregistering firms 
  Full Sample IFRS firms only 
High RegQuality firms 
only 
 Total_Accruals Total_Accruals Total_Accruals 
  (1) (2a) (2b) 
Neg*CFO*PostDereg -0.364** 0.291* -0.406 
 (2.54) (1.79) (1.43) 
Neg*PostDereg -0.051** -0.041 -0.069 
 (2.22) (1.46) (1.17) 
CFO*PostDereg -0.08 -0.253*** 0.063 
 (1.42) (3.27) (0.51) 
PostDereg 0.012 0.037*** -0.004 
 (1.03) (2.88) (0.20) 
Neg*CFO -0.188 1.363** -0.539 
 (0.43) (2.47) (0.69) 
Neg 0.037 0.001 0.002 
 (0.64) (0.02) (0.03) 
CFO 0.262 0.710*** 0.218 
 (1.19) (3.08) (0.67) 
Ln(Sales) 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007* 
 (3.19) (4.20) (1.74) 
Neg*Ln(Sales) 0.008* 0.007 0.013 
 (1.71) (1.32) (1.32) 
CFO*Ln(Sales) -0.030* -0.058*** -0.039 
 (1.80) (3.38) (1.53) 
Neg*CFO*Ln(Sales) 0.090** 0.140** 0.134 
 (2.14) (2.45) (1.37) 
Leverage -0.050*** -0.026 -0.073 
 (2.90) (1.49) (1.54) 
Neg*Leverage -0.251*** -0.183*** -0.307*** 
 (5.22) (3.39) (2.75) 
CFO*Leverage -0.226** -0.200** 0.112 
 (2.50) (2.06) (0.30) 
Neg*CFO*Leverage -0.948*** -0.355 -1.563** 
 (4.21) (1.35) (2.00) 
Market-to-Book 0 0.000*** 0 
 (1.16) (3.92) (0.60) 
Neg*Market-to-Book 0 0 0 
 (1.37) (1.42) (0.63) 
CFO*Market-to-Book 0.001*** -0.000* 0.001* 
 (3.27) (1.85) (1.96) 
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Neg*CFO*Market-to-
Book 
 
0.000 0.001 
 
0.000 
 (0.69) (1.26) (0.37) 
Intercept -0.242*** -5.23 -0.221*** 
 (5.58) (4.54) (4.17) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.52 0.51 0.43 
N 1,162 786 700 
In this panel deregistering firms are compared after deregistration to a matched sample of non-deregistering cross-
listed firms.  The dependent variable in the OLS regression is Total_Accruals is earnings before extraordinary items 
less operating cash flows, scaled by lagged total assets.  PostDereg is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 
for all firm-year observations after deregistration from the U.S. and 0 otherwise. Neg is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if cash flows from operations in year t are negative and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in 
Table 1.2 Panel A.  The t-statistics are listed in parenthesis below the coefficients. They are adjusted for clustering on 
firms.   ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 1.6: Alternative accounting quality proxies—deregistering firms only   
Panel A:   
 Deregistering Firms’ Accounting Quality 
  Pre-Deregistration Post-Deregistration 
Variability of OperInc /Variability of CFO 2.068 1.677*** 
Correlation of  
ΔAcc /ΔCFO -0.058 -0.176*** 
 
 
 
Panel B:           
 
Deregistering Firms’ Accounting Quality 
Pre-Deregistration firm-years only 
  Non-IFRS IFRS   Low RegQual High RegQual 
Variability of OperInc 
/Variability of CFO 1.928 1.629 
Variability of OperInc 
/Variability of CFO 1.582       2.497*** 
Correlation of 
ΔAcc/ΔCFO -0.051 -0.075 
Correlation of 
ΔAcc/ΔCFO -0.104 -0.070 
      
Panel C:           
 
Deregistering Firms’ Accounting Quality 
Post-Deregistration firm-years only 
  Non-IFRS IFRS   Low RegQual High RegQual 
Variability of OperInc 
/Variability of CFO 1.649     2.292*** 
Variability of OperInc 
/Variability of CFO 1.490 1.594 
Correlation of 
ΔAcc/ΔCFO -0.200 -0.168* 
Correlation of 
ΔAcc/ΔCFO -0.088 -0.182 
This table compares the earnings smoothing properties of deregistering firms before and after deregistration.  Panel A compares the full sample.  Panel B (Panel 
C) compares only pre-deregistration (post-deregistration) firm-year observations and splits the sample based on the variables IFRS and RegQual.  Variability of 
OperInc (Variability of CFO) is the standard deviation of operating income (cash flows from operations) scaled by lagged total assets. The correlation is the 
Spearman correlation between the change in accruals and the change in cash flow from operations, both scaled by lagged total assets.  
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Table 1.7: Alternative accounting quality proxies—deregistering firms v. matched non-deregistering firms   
   
Panel A: Deregistering Firms’ Accounting Quality v.  
Non-Deregistering Firms' Accounting Quality  
  Deregistering Firms Non-Dereg Firms 
Variability of OperInc /Variability of CFO 1.318 1.479** 
Correlation of  
ΔAcc/ΔCFO -0.206 -0.142* 
 
Panel B: Deregistering Firms’ Accounting Quality v. Non-Deregistering Firms' Accounting Quality  
 IFRS Firms Only  Non-IFRS Firms Only 
  
Deregistering 
Firms 
Non-
Deregistering 
Firms   Deregistering Firms 
Non-Deregistering 
Firms 
Variability of 
OperInc /Variability 
of CFO 1.370 1.365 
Variability of 
OperInc 
/Variability of 
CFO 0.998 1.331** 
Correlation of  
ΔAcc/ΔCFO -0.218 -0.180 
Correlation of  
ΔAcc/ΔCFO -0.263 -0.166** 
 
Panel C: Deregistering Firms’ Accounting Quality v. Non-Deregistering Firms' Accounting Quality  
 High RegQual Firms Only  Low RegQual Firms Only 
  
Deregistering 
Firms 
Non-
Deregistering 
Firms   Deregistering Firms 
Non-Deregistering 
Firms 
Variability of 
OperInc /Variability 
of CFO 1.482 1.409 
Variability of 
OperInc 
/Variability of 
CFO 1.375 1.411 
Correlation of  
ΔAcc/ΔCFO -0.240 -0.181 
Correlation of  
ΔAcc/ΔCFO -0.206 -0.099 
This table compares the earnings smoothing properties of deregistering firms to non-deregistering firms.  Panel A compares the full sample.  Panels B and C split 
the sample based on the variables IFRS and RegQual, respectively.  Measurements are as defined in Table 1.6.  
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Chapter 2: As foreign registrants abandon the U.S. capital markets, what happens to the 
cross-listing audit fee premium?  
2.1 Introduction 
A common strategy for non-U.S. firms to signal their quality to global capital markets was 
to register and cross-list in the United States.  In exchange for the costs of complying with U.S. 
accounting standards and subjecting themselves to a more stringent regulatory environment, these 
firms were able to potentially generate economic synergies (Sarkissian and Schill 2004), improve 
the efficiency of their securities’ pricing (Foerester and Karolyi 1999), and bond management to 
investor-friendly behavior (Coffee 2002).21  The impacts of compliance flowed through to their 
audit firms who now faced more complex accounting requirements and exposure to a higher degree 
of legal liability.  Prior literature has found that through 2002 it is the latter factor, the shift in legal 
and not accounting regimes, that is the leading source of cross-listing audit fee premiums, 
documented to be as much as twenty to thirty percent (Seetharaman, Gul, and Lynn 2002; Choi, 
Kim, Liu, and Simunic 2009). 
Since the end of these early studies on the cross-listing audit fee premium, there has been 
a global movement away from local country generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to 
a coalescing around the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)22, 
standardizing accounting reporting practices with a resultant improvement in accounting quality 
(Barth, Landsman, and Lang 2008).  The growing use of IFRS has also introduced an additional 
factor into audit pricing.  DeGeorge, Ferguson, and Spear (2013) argue that the greater knowledge 
                                                          
21 Additional benefits of cross-listing in the U.S. include increases in market valuation, accounting quality and analyst 
following, and a lower cost of capital (e.g. Lang, Lins, and Miller 2003a; Lang, Raedy, and Yetman 2003b; Doidge, 
Karolyi, and Stulz 2004; Hail and Leuz 2009).   
22 In 2002, the European Union mandated the use of IFRS, as set by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), for all publicly listed companies beginning in 2005, with a number of countries following suit thereafter. See 
http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Documents/2015/Who-We-Are-January-2015.pdf for a timeline of major IFRS 
events. 
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needed to understand IFRS and the increased effort in applying auditing procedures to reduce the 
risk of material misstatement lead to an increase in audit fees.   The authors find an audit fee 
premium incremental to normal yearly increases in audit fees which they conclude stems from the 
change in accounting standards and which persists beyond the initial year of adoption.  However, 
in this single country setting the authors are not able to address the link between IFRS and U.S. 
GAAP costs.  Kim, Liu, and Zheng (2012) extend these results into a multi-country setting and 
find an IFRS audit fee premium across the European Union following mandatory adoption.   Kim 
et al. discuss how changing from local GAAP to IFRS causes an “upward shift in audit complexity” 
(p. 2064) and this complexity extends beyond initial adoption to produce an IFRS premium in 
subsequent years.   
Around the same time as the development of IFRS, the regulatory fall-out from accounting 
scandals like Enron and WorldCom led to changes in regulatory and legal requirements worldwide.  
In the U.S., the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was created in 2002 to 
oversee, regulate, and inspect auditors of both foreign and domestic registrants.  Many other 
jurisdictions followed suit creating their own local audit regulators23 (Lamoreaux 2016) and thus, 
this time period also reflects a changing global legal landscape. The SEC believed that the 
combination of these accounting and regulatory developments were a threat to the U.S. cross-
listing market.  
To increase the attractiveness of the U.S. as a cross-listing venue, the SEC adopted Rule 
12h-6 in March 2007 which relaxed the deregistration requirements for foreign firms listed in the 
U.S.  The SEC argued this amendment “should result in reduced costs to issuers in determining 
whether they can terminate their Exchange Act reporting obligations” (SEC 2007b, 19) because 
                                                          
23 Lamoreaux (2016) finds that PCAOB inspection access increases audit quality in jurisdictions with and without a 
local regulator, however, its impact is greater in jurisdictions without a local regulator.  
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deregistration requirements will be based on more easily obtainable information and will not 
require annual re-verification.24  The SEC believed the change in legislation would encourage 
more firms to cross-list in the U.S.  However, the result was quite different and there has been a 
growing trend in voluntary deregistrations as compared to new cross-listings in recent years (see 
Figure 2.1). 
Examining deregistrations, foreign firms leaving the U.S. accounting and legal 
environment, provides an interesting setting to determine which of these factors has a greater effect 
in the setting of audit fees. I study an environment where foreign cross-listed firms have left the 
U.S. and moved into different legal and accounting regimes in their home markets.  The former 
influences auditors’ assessment of risk due to legal liability exposure, while the latter impacts 
auditors’ effort due to complexity of the standards.  
While many of these deregistering firms return to home markets which mandate the use of 
IFRS, there are also firms which return to reporting environments in which local accounting 
standards, generally thought to be less complex than IFRS or U.S. GAAP, are required.  Similarly, 
many firms return to home markets with levels of legal liability comparable to the U.S., while for 
others deregistration signals a decrease in auditors’ liability exposure.  It is thus an empirical 
question which factor better explains the impact on audit fees following deregistration from U.S. 
exchanges.   
Deregistration from the U.S. allows me to conduct multiple levels of analysis.  For a sample 
of 105 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations (with necessary data available) from 2004 to 2013, I 
first examine the association between deregistration and audit fees. In both univariate and cross-
sectional analyses, I find that audit fees are significantly lower in the year after deregistration 
                                                          
24 See footnote #1 in Chapter 1 for a detailed description of Rule 12h-6.  
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compared to the year before deregistration for deregistering firms.  Utilizing a difference-in-
difference research design I reach similar conclusions when examining the audit fees of 
deregistering firms and a matched set of control firms that continue to maintain a U.S. cross-listing.   
To determine whether this main effect can be attributed to a decrease in legal liability or 
complexity I next add to the models measures of the home market.25  First, I utilize the Wingate 
(1997) index to capture the legal liability regime in the home market.26  Second, I measure home 
markets that mandate the use of IFRS, which allows me to capture firms whose financial reporting 
remains complex following deregistration.  After adding these measures to the model, both 
separately and jointly, I find that while the decrease in audit fees is mitigated for firms using IFRS, 
the strength of the home market’s legal regime has no effect on the negative association between 
deregistration and audit fees.  Thus, the results show that the decrease in complexity for non-IFRS 
firms relative to IFRS firms is the main driver of the lower level of audit fees following 
deregistration.   Further tests using the change in audit fees supports the main results that it is the 
change in complexity, and not the change in legal liability, stemming from deregistration that 
drives the change in audit fees after foreign firms leave the U.S.27  
By incorporating an important element that did not exist at the time of their studies, 
specifically the widespread use of IFRS, I extend the results in Seetharaman et al. (2002) and Choi 
et al. (2009) to show that the cross-listing audit fee premium disappears for firms whose audit 
complexity decreases after deregistration (non-IFRS firms), while firms with no change in 
complexity (IFRS firms) experience no significant audit fee changes around deregistration.  While 
                                                          
25 Leuz (2003a) argues that prior research has focused on the main or average effect of cross-listing rather than 
potentially more interesting interactive effects of institutional variables, which are important for analyzing cross-
listing effects in cross-sectional research designs.  He encourages researchers to “exploit institutional differences 
across settings to tease out the sources of cross-listing effects” (p. 352).   
26 The results are robust to alternative proxies (see Section 2.5). 
27 Given the Wingate (1997) index is a static measure, I utilize a legal liability proxy from the World Bank in the 
changes analyses.  See Section 2.5 for details.  
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this appears to stand in contrast to the earlier studies that find audit fees are driven by changes in 
legal liability, the result is attributable to the significant developments in the accounting and 
auditing landscape brought about by IFRS adoption in the past decade (Kim et al. 2012; DeGeorge 
et al. 2013).   This study contributes to the literature by combining research on cross-listing, IFRS, 
and auditing.  While the results show specifically the influence IFRS has on audit fees in a cross-
listing setting, it also addresses more broadly the impact of IFRS on the global business 
environment.  The paper also adds to recent literature on foreign firm deregistrations (e.g. Hostak, 
Lys, Yang, and Carr 2013; Li 2014). 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section develops the 
hypotheses. The sample selection and research design are discussed in Section 2.3, followed by 
the main results and a discussion of additional analyses in Sections 2.4 and 2.5, respectively. 
Finally, Section 2.6 concludes the paper. 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
In a competitive market, audit fees are modeled as the sum of the auditor’s expected future 
losses and the auditor’s production costs (Simunic 1980).  Future losses stem from any costs 
incurred because of litigation against the auditor for their role in the engagement. The probability 
of litigation occurring and the extent of potential losses are functions of the legal liability regime 
to which an audit firm is subject.  Productions costs are related to the auditor’s effort.  The effort 
level is determined by the auditee’s size, risk, and complexity (Simunic 1980; Hay, Knechel, and 
Wong 2006).  Focusing on the last determinant, audit fees increase with complexity as this captures 
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the characteristics of an auditee that are difficult and time-consuming to audit, leading to greater 
auditor effort.28   
It has been shown, both theoretically and empirically, that as a country’s legal regime 
becomes stronger, the auditor’s potential loss exposure due to litigation increases, leading to higher 
audit fees (Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic 2008).   By cross-listing in the U.S., firms subject their 
auditors to the added scrutiny of the U.S. legal environment.  Case law has shown that the 1934 
Securities Act’s antifraud provisions have transnational jurisdiction, applying in particular to non-
U.S. auditors (Seetharaman et al. 2002).  To cover this exposure, Seetharaman et al. find that U.K. 
auditors charge higher audit fees when clients cross-list in the U.S., but not other markets.  
Expanding upon this study, Choi et al. (2009) examine world-wide cross-listings and find an 
economically significant audit fee premium for firms cross-listing in environments with stronger 
legal regimes compared to their home markets. Following these arguments, if legal liability 
exposure is one of the leading determinants of cross-listed firms’ audit fees, then the association 
between deregistration and audit fees is expected to be influenced by the strength of the home 
market’s legal environment as compared to the U.S. 
However, prior literature has shown that there is relatively little oversight and enforcement 
by the SEC of cross-listed firms (Siegel 2005).  Cheng, Srinivasan, and Yu (2014) find that the 
litigation rate against foreign cross-listed firms is significantly lower than that of a matched U.S. 
sample with similar ex-ante litigation risk. They conclude, therefore, that the threat of lawsuits 
does not restrain corporate misreporting for foreign firms as strongly as it does for U.S. firms. 
Similarly, Srinivasan, Wahid, and Yu (2015) find that the lower number of restatements for cross-
                                                          
28 Audit fees are also positively associated with the two other determinants of auditor effort: client size, as proxied by 
total assets, and client risk, historically proxied by inventory, receivables, negative earnings, and leverage, among 
others (Simunic 1980; Hay et al. 2006). 
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listed firms compared to U.S. firms is attributable to less stringent monitoring.  Given these 
arguments of lax enforcement and low liability exposure that already exist before deregistration, 
audit fees following deregistration are not expected to be influenced by changes in the auditor’s 
legal environment.   
 The other main determinant of audit fees, complexity, has typically been measured in the 
audit fee literature by variables such as a client’s subsidiaries or segments, proportion of foreign 
assets, or cross-listing status (e.g. Simunic 1980; Choi et al. 2008).  This last feature is of particular 
importance when the cross-listing venue is the U.S. due to the stringent accounting and disclosure 
requirements of the SEC.  Since 1980 the SEC has required foreign firms to reconcile their 
financial statements to U.S. GAAP because “investors’ need for the same type of basic information 
implies that foreign and domestic registrants should be subject to the same disclosure 
requirements” (SEC 2007c).29  However, in the decades since the reconciliation requirements were 
first established, the accounting landscape has significantly changed with the increasing use of 
IFRS.  The SEC realized that the: 
“auditor community has embraced IFRS as a workable set of standards that can generally 
be applied across industries and countries. The global auditing profession has been able to 
audit and report on many thousands of financial statements prepared using either IFRS as 
published by the IASB or a jurisdictional variation of IFRS” (SEC 2007c).  
 
Recognizing the global growth of IFRS audited financial statements and its comparable high-
quality with U.S. GAAP, the SEC enacted an amendment in 2007 allowing the acceptance of IFRS-
prepared financial statements in SEC filings without reconciliation to U.S. GAAP for cross-listed 
firms.30 
                                                          
29 Before 1980, SEC guidance with respect to financial statements of foreign issuers required only that the “accounting 
principles used by foreign private issuers have authoritative support”.  Annual reports required only a narrative 
description of the differences between foreign accounting principles and U.S. GAAP (SEC 2007c).  
30 See Section 2.5 for a more robust discussion of this time period, as well as additional empirical tests conducted 
around the new legislation.  
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The adoption of IFRS is associated with a significant audit fee premium.  Kim et al. (2012) 
and DeGeorge et al. (2013) find the complexity of the fair-value oriented and principals-based 
standards results in greater auditor effort leading to higher audit fees.  DeGeorge et al. (2013) 
conduct a single-country study, and thus, in holding the legal enforcement environment constant, 
they conclude the complexity of IFRS drives the audit fee premium.  Kim et al. (2012) find mixed 
results when examining the impact of legal regimes on the IFRS-related audit fee premium across 
the European Union and find no support that concurrent reforms in corporate governance or 
enforcement mechanisms are the source of the audit fee effects.  Both studies additionally find this 
audit fee premium exists even after the initial adoption year, indicating potential long-term effects 
for IFRS firms.31  
Because of the growing use of IFRS in the last decade as well as the requirement that only 
local GAAP-using firms must continue to reconcile their financial statements to U.S. GAAP, 
foreign firms do not experience a uniform decrease in audit complexity following deregistration 
from U.S. exchanges.  If complexity is the dominant determinant of audit fees for cross-listed 
firms, then the association between deregistration and audit fees is expected to be influenced by 
the use of IFRS in the home market.   
However, Seetharaman et al. (2002) find no significant difference in the audit fee premium 
for U.K. firms cross-listed on the U.S. OTC market compared to U.K. firms cross-listed on major 
U.S. exchanges, where the accounting disclosure requirements are more stringent.32  Similarly, 
Choi et al. (2009) find no significant audit fee premiums for firms cross-listed on exchanges with 
                                                          
31 On the other hand, Goncharov, Riedl, and Sellhorn (2014) find that firms that switch to reporting assets at fair value 
following mandatory IFRS adoption, on average, experience a reduction in audit fees. However, the authors find that 
audit fees are increasing in the complexity of measuring fair value. The study examines firms in the European real 
estate industry. To account for any differences due to industry-specific auditing conditions, the models include 
industry fixed effects. 
32 See footnote #10 in Chapter 1 for a classification of the types of cross-listings on U.S. exchanges.  
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regimes similar or weaker to their home market and argue the complexity of cross-listing does not 
drive audit fee increases.  However, as Choi et al. (2009) point out, there exists the possibility that 
audit complexity increases only when a firm is cross-listed in stronger not weaker legal regimes, 
and thus, it is complexity that is behind the cross-listing audit fee premium.  Additionally, as 
mentioned earlier, these studies were both completed before the adoption of IFRS, which 
significantly changed the cross-listing market. 
2.3       Sample Selection and Research Design 
The sample period starts in 2004 coinciding with the final adoption of SOX and the start 
of wide-spread mandatory adoption of IFRS.  Table 2.1 Panel A details the sample composition. 
Due to changes in form filing requirements during the sample period, two sources are utilized to 
obtain foreign firm deregistrations. Following the enactment of Rule 12h-6 in March 2007, all 
foreign firm deregistrations are filed under SEC Form 15F, as opposed to the earlier SEC Form 15 
which contained both foreign and domestic deregistrations. Using the Edgar Online I-Metrix 
database, I collect 439 involuntary and voluntary Form 15Fs filed from March 2007 through 
December 2013.  To collect deregistrations from 2004 through February 2007 and ensure complete 
coverage in the Edgar Online I-Metrix database for the latter sample period, I also utilize the online 
ADR directories of Bank of New York, Citibank, and JP Morgan to obtain all voluntary and 
involuntary foreign firm deregistrations throughout the sample period.33  Any duplicates between 
the two listings are eliminated, as well as any amendments to previously filed forms.   
The sample is further restricted to include only foreign firms subject to SEC disclosure 
requirements and thus excludes OTC listed firms or firms incorporated in the U.S. I read through 
all Form 15 or 15F filings as well as additional proxy statements or press releases to ensure that I 
                                                          
33 See adrbnymellon.com, citiadr.idmanagedsolutions.com, and adr.com, respectively. 
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capture only voluntary deregistrations. Forty-four firms are eliminated that deregister due to a 
merger and acquisition and 8 that were delisted by their U.S. exchanges due to violating listing 
requirements. I also focus only on firms deregistering equity securities. As information is collected 
after deregistration from the U.S., audit fee data availability is subject to individual country-level 
regulation.  As such, 61 firms are eliminated due to missing audit fee disclosures or other necessary 
financial information in the Worldscope database.34  After also eliminating financial firms, the 
sample stands at 118 voluntary foreign deregistrations. Finally, because Canadian firms cross-
listed in the U.S. are not classified as “ADRs” and are exempt from the U.S. reporting rules 
required of other cross-listed firms, consistent with prior literature, Canadian firms are eliminated 
from the sample. 
The final sample consists of 105 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from 2004 through 
2013.  Table 2.1 Panel B shows there is a spike in 2007, the year deregistration requirements were 
lessened.  However, including year fixed effects in all regressions eliminates concern about any 
time-specific trends influencing the analysis. The U.K., France, and Germany represent the highest 
number of deregistering firms.  It is of note that when examining the breakdown of deregistering 
firms by year and country the sample composition is consistent with prior studies (e.g. Marosi and 
Massoud 2008; Doidge et al. 2010; Hostak et al. 2013).   
Deregistration from the U.S. provides an interesting setting because it allows me to conduct 
multiple levels of analyses.  First, by comparing audit fees in the pre- and post-deregistration 
periods for deregistering firms only, each firm is its own control, and the focus is on changes in 
the level of audit fees, while controlling for other time-invariant firm and country characteristics.  
                                                          
34 I lose 5 deregistering firms because of lack of data availability for the legal liability proxy, the Wingate index 
(Hungary, Israel, and Luxembourg).  In sensitivity tests using World Bank legal proxies in both levels and changes 
analyses I include these additional observations and find the results unaltered.   
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Second, comparing audit fees for deregistering firms to a matched group of non-deregistering 
cross-listed firms using a difference-in-difference research design controls for other general trends 
or changes in the economic environment unrelated to deregistration. 
 
 
2.3.1 Levels Analyses: Deregistering Firms Only 
The models used in this paper are based on the seminal work by Simunic (1980) which 
measures audit fees as a function of client size, risk, and complexity.  To first establish whether 
there is an association between deregistration and audit fees for deregistering firms, the following 
OLS regression is run (firm and year subscripts omitted): 
Ln(Audit Fees) = β0 + β1Post + δControls + Fixed Effects + e                                            (1), 
where Ln(AuditFees) is the natural logarithm of audit fees from Worldscope. The main variable of 
interest in this model that includes only deregistering firms is Post, an indicator variable which 
takes the value of 1 for all firm-year observations in the year after deregistration from the U.S. and 
0 for all firm-year observations in the year before deregistration, with the year of deregistration 
removed from the analysis.  A negative coefficient on Post indicates that firms have lower audit 
fees in the year after deregistration compared to the year before.35  After first examining whether 
deregistration from the U.S. and audit fees are associated, I then test whether the source of this 
association stems from changes in legal liability or changes in complexity.   
To measure an auditor’s liability exposure, I utilize the Wingate (1997) index which has 
been used extensively in the auditing literature to proxy for a country’s litigation risk (e.g. Choi et 
                                                          
35 In this section, I only examine the short window comparing the year before to the year after deregistration for 
deregistering firms.  In further analyses in Section 2.5, I extend this model to examine a longer time-series and find 
the results are statistically similar.  As this long-term analysis suffers from issues of potential additional confounding 
firm events that have not been controlled for, the main tests focus on the shorter time frame surrounding deregistration.  
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al. 2008; Choi et al. 2009; Asthana, Raman, and Xu 2015). It was developed by an international 
insurance underwriter for one of the Big 6 audit firms and represents the risks an auditor faces in 
a particular country based on the country’s legal, regulatory, political, and economic environments 
(Wingate 1997; Choi et al. 2009).  The index ranges from 1 to 10, with higher values indicating a 
more litigious environment.36  Regime is defined as the natural logarithm of the index.  This 
variable is interacted with post-deregistration firm-year observations to examine if the legal 
environment auditor’s face in the home market is associated with the relationship, if any, between 
audit fees and deregistration using the following OLS model:   
Ln(AuditFees) = β0 + β1Post + β2Regime + β3Post*Regime + δControls + Fixed Effects + e   (2). 
If the coefficient on Post is negative, while the coefficient on the interaction term is positive, this 
indicates that the negative association between audit fees and deregistration is driven by a decrease 
in legal liability exposure.   
 To test whether complexity influences the association between deregistration and audit 
fees, I utilize the growth in IFRS usage throughout the sample period and arguments from prior 
literature that the new accounting standards have shifted audit complexity upward (Kim et al. 2012; 
DeGeorge et al. 2013).  Complexity is measured using an indicator variable, IFRS, which takes 
the value of 1 for firm-year observations in which financial statements are prepared using IFRS 
and 0 otherwise.37  The model in equation (2) is rerun, to test whether complexity influences the 
association between deregistration and audit fees:  
Ln(AuditFees) = β0 + β1Post + β2IFRS + β3Post*IFRS + δControls + Fixed Effects + e         (3). 
                                                          
36 Given the Wingate index is static, I am unable to calculate the change in a country’s value from before to after 
deregistration for the sample firms.  As such, when I discuss the change analyses in the following sections, I introduce 
an alternative proxy for a country’s legal regime that is a yearly measure.  
37 It is of note that none of the 105 deregistering firms in the sample are voluntary IFRS adopters.  Thus, the variable 
IFRS in this study captures firms whose home markets mandate the use of IFRS. 
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In this model, Post on its own captures deregistering firms returning to home markets that have 
not adopted IFRS.  For these firms, deregistration from the U.S. signals a reduction in audit 
complexity as the firm is no longer required to prepare a U.S. GAAP reconciliation and returns to 
using only local accounting standards.  A negative coefficient on Post combined with a positive 
coefficient on Post*IFRS indicates that audit fees decrease because of a reduction in complexity.  
This implies that firms returning to IFRS environments, where complexity levels are comparable 
to the U.S., experience no significant change in audit fees around deregistration, while the audit 
fee decrease can be attributed to non-IFRS firms, whose complexity level decreases following 
deregistration.  Lastly, I combine models (2) and (3) to simultaneously control for both changes in 
legal liability and complexity.38   
 All the models described above contain control variables prior literature has found to be 
strong determinants of audit fees and are collected from the Worldscope database (Simunic 1980; 
Hay et al. 2006; DeFond and Zhang 2014).  The natural log of total assets (LnAssets) is used to 
measure size.  To capture client risk, I use the ratio of inventory and receivables to total assets 
(Inv_Rec), the return on assets ratio (ROA), negative net income years (Loss), the debt to equity 
ratio (Leverage), and the ratio of current assets to current liabilities (Current Ratio).  While client 
complexity is captured using IFRS in the models, I also include the number of business and 
geographic segments as well as whether there were any acquisitions or disposals during the year, 
all of which represent hard and time-consuming areas of the audit (Ln(Bus Seg), Ln(Geo Seg), 
Acquisition).  Indicator variables for Big-N auditors (Big4), December yearend clients 
                                                          
38 In addition to the combined model with all interaction terms, in the test of legal liability using model 2, I control for 
complexity (IFRS) and in the test of complexity using model 3, I control for legal liability (Regime).   
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(DecemberYE), and qualified audit opinions (Qualified)39 are also included, as these variables have 
been shown in prior literature to be positively related to audit fees.  Lastly, country, year, and 
industry fixed effects are included to account for potential variation in audit fees across the 
different groups or time periods.40   
2.3.2 Difference-in-Difference: Deregistering and Non-Deregistering Firms 
 While the previous analyses enables me to use the firm as its own control and compare 
audit fees in the year after to the year before deregistration, I am unable to control for other general 
trends or changes in the economic environment unrelated to deregistration.  Therefore, I conduct 
a difference-in-differences test using a control sample of matched non-deregistering firms.  By 
matching deregistering firms with non-deregistering firms on country, year, industry and size41, I 
control for any concurrent changes in audit fees that may also affect non-deregistering firms and 
confound the results from the analyses discussed in the prior section.  I estimate the following OLS 
model: 
Ln(AuditFees) = β0 + β1Post + β2Dereg + β3Post*Dereg + δControls + Fixed Effects + e         (4). 
The variable that separates treatment from control firms in this model is Dereg.  Dereg 
takes the value of 1 for all firm-year observations in the treatment sample (i.e. deregistering firms) 
and 0 for all firm-year observations in the control sample (i.e. matched non-deregistering firms).  
Post takes the value of 1 for observations after deregistration and 0 for observations before 
                                                          
39 None of the deregistering firms received a qualified audit opinion in the years under study.  As such this variable is 
not included in regression output in the tables that include only deregistering firms.  However, one matched non-
deregistering firm received a qualified audit opinion, and thus this variable appears in those regression results.   
40 All reported t-statistics in the tables listed in parentheses below the coefficients result from robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm-level.   
41 I use Ln(Assets) to proxy for firm size as prior literature has found this to be the leading determinant of audit fees 
(Hay et al. 2006).  To match on industry, I use 2-digit SIC codes. To the extent an exact industry match cannot be 
found, given the small sample size, rather than lose observations I match on only country, year, and size.  Similarly, 
if an exact country match cannot be found the observation is matched on year, industry, and size with an observation 
from a country with a similar legal and accounting environment.  This is only the case for 4 New Zealand sample 
firms that are matched to 4 Australian control firms.  Including controls for industry and country fixed effects in all 
regressions alleviates any issues with this relaxation in matching criteria.    
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deregistration.  For the control sample, I assign pseudo-deregistration years based on the matched 
deregistering firm’s year of deregistration and Post is thus measured in the same way as described 
for deregistering firms (Kim et al. 2012).  Pre-deregistration consists of firm-year observations of 
up to four years before deregistration or pseudo-deregistration (Post equal to 0).  Post-
deregistration consists of firm-year observations from one year after deregistration or pseudo-
deregistration (Post equal to 1).  In this model, the coefficient of interest is the interaction term, 
which captures the incremental change in audit fees from the pre- to post-deregistration period in 
the treatment sample relative to the incremental change in the control sample.  The control 
variables and fixed effects are as described in the previous section.   
As in the levels analyses, I am also interested in the role institutional factors play in the 
association between deregistration and audit fees.  As such, I estimate the following two 
regressions to determine if the home country’s legal or accounting environment impact audit fees: 
Ln(AuditFees) = β0 + β1Post + β2Dereg + β3Post*Dereg + β4Regime + β5Post*Regime +  
  Β6Dereg*Regime + Β7Post*Dereg*Regime + δControls + Fixed Effects + e      (5). 
Ln(AuditFees) = β0 + β1Post + β2Dereg + β3Post*Dereg + β4IFRS + β5Post*IFRS +  
  Β6Dereg*IFRS + Β7Post*Dereg*IFRS + δControls + Fixed Effects + e                 (6). 
Post and Dereg are as defined in equation (4) and Regime and IFRS as in equations (2) and (3), 
respectively.  In equation (5), finding a positive coefficient on three-way interaction 
(Post*Dereg*Regime) along with a negative coefficient on the two-way interaction (Post*Dereg) 
indicates that the incremental decrease in audit fees following deregistration is mitigated for firms 
returning to home markets with more litigious legal environments.  Similarly, a positive coefficient 
on three-way interaction (Post*Dereg*IFRS) in equation (6) indicates that the incremental 
decrease in audit fees following deregistration is mitigated for firms returning to home markets 
that mandate the use of IFRS.  The control variables, fixed effects, and robust firm-level clustered 
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standard errors are as described in the previous section.  As in the earlier analyses, the year (or 
pseudo-year) of deregistration is removed from the analysis. 
2.4       Results 
Table 2.2 presents a univariate analysis of the 105 deregistering firms in the year before 
and the year after deregistration.  The mean and median of the main dependent variable, Ln(Audit 
Fees), is statistically and significantly different between the two time periods.  Compared to the 
year before, foreign firms have a significantly lower level of audit fees in the year following 
deregistration from the U.S.  Interestingly, the remaining firm characteristics, which are 
determinants of audit fees, have not changed significantly between the two periods.  Overall, there 
appear to be no significant changes in firms’ operations between the two time-periods, other than 
deregistration from the U.S., which could be driving the decrease in audit fees.42  
2.4.1 Levels Analyses: Deregistering Firms Only 
 The results from running a cross-sectional regression of the level of audit fees on the 
sample of deregistering firms only are displayed in Table 2.3.  The test for the main effect of this 
association is displayed in column (1) with Post as the main variable of interest.  After controlling 
for other determinants of audit fees, the coefficient on this variable is negative and significant.  In 
terms of economic significance, firms deregistering from the U.S. experience a 47% decrease in 
audit fees in the year after versus the year before deregistration.43   
To determine the source of this negative association, column (2) in Table 2.3 includes the 
Regime interaction term to determine if the legal environment in the home market influences the 
relationship between deregistration and audit fees.  While the indicator Post continues to be 
                                                          
42 All univariate and multivariate results are statistically and economically robust to converting audit fees and assets 
to U.S. dollar amounts.   
43 Following prior audit fee studies, I measure economic significance as (ea-1), where a denotes the coefficient on the 
variable of interest (e.g. Seetharaman et al. 2002; Ghosh and Pawlewicz 2009). 
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negative and significant, the coefficient on Post*Regime is statistically insignificant.  Thus, the 
legal environment in the home market does not affect the association between deregistration and 
audit fees.  Firms returning to home markets characterized by stringent legal liability experience 
the same significant decrease in audit fees as those firms returning to home markets with lower 
legal liability exposure for auditors.   
To examine the other potential source of deregistration effects, in column (3) the 
interaction of IFRS and Post captures firms experiencing no change in audit complexity following 
deregistration.  Post continues to be negative and statistically significant, implying those firms 
returning to non-IFRS environments experience a significant decrease in audit fees, attributable to 
the decrease in audit complexity.  On the other hand, the interaction term Post*IFRS is positive 
and significant indicating the decrease in audit fees is mitigated by the use of IFRS in the home 
market.  Thus, the negative association between deregistration and audit fees is driven by the 
change in audit complexity for foreign firms.   
The insignificant coefficient on IFRS is also notable as it shows that before deregistration 
accounting standards were not significantly associated with the level of audit fees.  Though prior 
studies have found IFRS users experience an audit fee premium over domestic GAAP users, the 
complexity domestic GAAP users face in the U.S. due to SEC reporting requirements resulted in 
no significant difference in audit fees between the two groups.  The coefficients on Post and 
Post*IFRS thus capture the extent to which the act of deregistration impacts audit fees and ensures 
the results are not being driven by any pre-existing difference in the level of audit fees between 
the two groups.44   
                                                          
44 See Section 2.5 for a further discussion and analyses of the association between pre-deregistration audit fees and 
accounting standards, specifically the changing requirements for IFRS firms in the U.S. over the sample period.  
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Column (4) in Table 2.3 combines columns (2) and (3) to simultaneously control for both 
the legal and accounting environments in the home market post-deregistration.  Similar to the 
results in column (3), the last column continues to show a negative association between audit fees 
and deregistration from U.S. markets and that this negative relationship is mitigated by the use of 
IFRS.  The insignificant coefficient on Post*Regime and the significant positive coefficient on 
Post*IFRS confirms that the source of the deregistration effect appears to be a change in audit 
complexity for cross-listed firms.  The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on the control 
variables remain the same across all four specifications. The high R-squared values are consistent 
with prior audit fee studies and the use of country, year, and industry fixed effects. 
2.4.2 Difference-in-Difference: Deregistering and Non-Deregistering Firms 
Table 2.4 shows the results from the difference-in-difference research design tested on the 
sample of deregistering firms and matched non-deregistering firms. In Column (1) the coefficient 
on Post shows that non-deregistering firms from the control sample experienced an average 5.25% 
decrease in audit fees.  Post*Dereg shows the incremental fee decreasing effect associated with 
deregistration from the U.S. in the treatment sample.  A deregistering firm experienced an average 
43.7% decrease in audit fees in the post-deregistration period.45 This is approximately a 38% 
greater average decrease in fees than in the benchmark non-deregistering group.   
Columns (2) and (3) test the source of this negative association between deregistration and 
audit fees.  Consistent with the results in Table 2.3, these two columns show that it is the decrease 
in audit complexity and not the decrease in legal liability which drives the decrease in audit fees.  
The interaction term that includes institutional factors is insignificant in column (2) (i.e. 
Post*Dereg*Regime), while column (3) finds a negative association between deregistration and 
                                                          
45 This figure is obtained by analyzing the coefficients on Post and Post*Dereg together: exp(β1 + β3) - 1.  
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audit fees, which is mitigated by the use of IFRS (Post*Dereg*IFRS).  Lastly, as in Table 2.3, the 
last column shows that after controlling for both the home market legal and accounting 
environments, the negative association between deregistration and audit fees is  driven by firms 
experiencing a decrease in audit complexity and not by firms experiencing a decrease in legal 
liability. The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on the control variables remain the same 
across all four specifications. 
2.5       Additional Analyses 
2.5.1 Change Analyses 
To mitigate concern about potential problems of correlated omitted variables, I also 
conduct change analyses.  These regressions control for any time trends or unobservable firm-
specific effects.  Given the proxy for legal liability (Regime) is a static index from Wingate (1997), 
I am unable to calculate the change in this measurement from the year before to the year after 
deregistration.  Thus, I use a non-static proxy for legal liability.46  To measure the changing legal 
liability environment in a country, I obtain the Rule of Law index from the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, a dataset produced by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2013) 
covering the time periods and countries in the sample.47  This dataset has been used extensively in 
prior literature to proxy for the quality of a country’s legal and enforcement regimes (e.g. Doidge, 
Karolyi, and Stulz 2007; Byard, Li, and Yu 2011; Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 2013).  A key feature 
of the dataset and methodology is that it includes a margin of error for each country’s yearly 
estimate, which the authors argue needs to be taken into account when making comparisons across 
                                                          
46 I also run a changes model using Regime even though I am unable to calculate the change and include this in column 
(2) in Table 2.5.  
47 Using this proxy I am able to include 5 additional deregistering firms in the tests, thus the sample sizes in the two 
columns in Table 2.5 are not equal.  Excluding these 5 firms in the model that uses RuleLaw does not significantly 
alter the results.  
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countries. The U.S. is used as the benchmark and I classify any country-year with an upper-bound 
percentile rank greater or equal to the U.S.’s upper-bound rank (higher ranks indicating a more 
stringent legal environment) as having a comparable legal regime.  As such, I set values of 
RuleLaw equal to 1 for these country-year observations and 0 otherwise. 
The dependent variable is now the change in audit fees from the year before deregistration 
to the year after deregistration, removing the year of deregistration from the analysis.  For the 
sample of deregistering firms only the model is: 
Ln(AuditFees)t+1 - Ln(AuditFees)t-1   = β0 + β1∆RuleLaw + β2∆Complexity +  
δControls + Fixed Effects + e              (7), 
where t is the year of deregistration.  As this model only includes deregistering firms, there is no 
need to include an indicator variable for change of cross-listing status.  The two variables of 
interest are ∆RuleLaw and ∆Complexity.  The former takes the value of 1 for firms returning to 
legal environments less stringent than the U.S., and thus experiencing a decrease in auditors’ legal 
liability exposure, and 0 for firms returning to legal environments comparable to the U.S., and thus 
experiencing no change in auditors’ legal liability exposure.  The latter takes the value of 1 for 
firms returning to non-IFRS accounting environments, and thus experiencing a decrease in audit 
complexity and 0 for firms returning to IFRS environments, and thus, experiencing no change in 
audit complexity.  A negative coefficient on either variable indicates that the decrease in legal 
liability or complexity, or both, is associated with a decrease in audit fees for deregistering firms.  
The control variables are the same as those described above, but are measured as the change 
from year t-1 to year t+1.  For indicator variables, I follow the steps in Ghosh and Pawlewicz 
(2009).  For example, the Loss indicator is now represented by two separate indicator variables: 
(1) NoLoss-to-Loss, which equals 1 for firms that reported no loss in year t-1, but reported a loss 
in year t+1 and; (2) Loss-to-NoLoss, which equals 1 for firms that reported a loss in year t-1, but 
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reported no loss in year t+1.  Separate indicator variables for Acquisition, December, and Qualified 
are created in a similar manner.  Given the small sample size, if there are no observations that fall 
into one of the newly created categories, then the variable is omitted from the regression output in 
the tables.   
The findings are presented in Table 2.5.  Column (1) shows the results using RuleLaw to 
proxy for legal liability in the home market; however, I also report the results using the original 
proxy, Regime, in column (2).  Table 2.5 shows that the change in audit fees from the year before 
to the year after deregistration is not significantly associated with a change in legal liability.  There 
is no significant impact on audit fees for those firms experiencing a decrease in legal liability as 
captured by ∆RuleLaw.  However, for firms experiencing a decrease in complexity, which are 
those firms that leave the U.S. to return to a non-IFRS home market, the coefficient on 
∆Complexity is negative and statistically significant.  These results confirm the earlier findings 
that it is the decrease in audit complexity that is driving the decrease in audit fees after 
deregistration.  The lower R-squared value compared to the earlier tables is consistent with audit 
fee change regressions (Ghosh and Pawlewicz 2009).   
For the sample that includes deregistering firms and the matched control group of non-
deregistering firms, the model is: 
Ln(AuditFees)t+1 - Ln(AuditFees)t-1   = β0 + β1∆Cross-listingStatus + β2∆RuleLaw +  
β3∆Complexity + δControls + Fixed Effects + e              (8), 
where t is the year of deregistration.   As this model includes non-deregistering firms, an indicator 
variable is needed to distinguish those firm year-observations for which the cross-listing status has 
changed, i.e. the firm deregistered from the U.S.  This is captured by ∆Cross-listingStatus which 
is coded 1 for deregistering firms and 0 otherwise.  The other two variables of interest, ∆RuleLaw 
and ∆Complexity, are as defined above.  In this model, I am unable to include interaction terms 
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because non-deregistering firms experience no change in legal liability and complexity, as they 
maintain a U.S. cross-listing and are continually exposed to the U.S. legal and accounting 
environment.   
 The results are displayed in Table 2.6 which, similar to Table 2.5, includes a column using 
the ∆RuleLaw proxy and a column using the Regime proxy.48  Consistent with the results in earlier 
tables, I find that deregistration from the U.S. is associated with a negative and statistically 
significant change in audit fees.  Table 2.6 further shows that the source of this association is those 
firms experiencing a decrease in audit complexity and not those firms experiencing a decrease in 
legal liability.  This analysis leads me to conclude that it is the change in audit complexity which 
drives the change in audit fees for deregistering firms.   
2.5.2 Alternative Proxies 
The main results have shown that the legal liability in the home market, as measured by 
the Wingate (1997) index or the World Bank’s Rule of Law index, is not a source of the negative 
association between deregistration and accounting quality.  To ensure that the results are not being 
driven by the proxy choice, the tests described earlier are repeated using different measures to 
capture the home market legal environment.  I separately utilize the anti-director index, updated 
by Spamann (2010), which measures the degree of shareholder protection in a country and the 
anti-self-dealing index from Djankov, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), which 
measures the extent to which minority shareholders are legally protected from insider self-dealing.  
Additionally, I obtain from the World Bank’s database the classification of countries’ legal origins 
(i.e. code versus common law).   The earlier results for both the level and change analyses are 
                                                          
48 Similar to the sample size in Table 2.5, the sample in Table 2.6 is affected by the choice of proxy.  I include 5 
additional deregistering and matched non-deregistering firms in the tests, thus the sample sizes in the two columns in 
Table 2.6 are not equal.  Excluding these 10 firms in the model that uses RuleLaw does not significantly alter the 
results. 
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robust to the use of each of these three alternative measures to capture the legal environment in a 
home market (untabulated). 
2.5.3 Long-Term Trends 
The tests focus on the impact of deregistration on audit fees and as such, the main analysis 
for deregistering firms only includes just the year before and year after deregistration from the 
U.S.  This shorter time period enables me to have a balanced panel of firm-year observations and 
ensures the only major firm event in the time-period is deregistration from the U.S.  However, to 
be certain the results of the main tests are not one-year decreases in audit fees and instead represent 
a shift in the auditor-client relationship as a result of the change in cross-listing status, I also repeat 
the deregistering firm analyses extending the sample to include multiple years before and after 
deregistration.  In doing so, I create an unbalanced panel, as the year of deregistration varies, and 
thus, some firms have more pre- than post-deregistration observations and vice versa.  The results 
of this analysis (untabulated) show the main results hold.  There continues to exist a negative 
association between deregistration and audit fees and the source of this association is the decrease 
in audit complexity for non-IFRS firms and not the decrease in legal liability.  However, as this 
long-term analysis suffers from issues of potential additional confounding firm events that have 
not been controlled for, the main tests focus on the shorter time frame surrounding deregistration.   
2.5.4 Concurrent SEC Regulation Eliminating Reconciliation for IFRS Firms 
One of these events that may influence the main results is the 2007 SEC ruling that 
eliminated the reconciliation to U.S. GAAP for IFRS-using foreign firms.  Given that after this 
year, auditors of IFRS firms no longer needed to audit the U.S. GAAP reconciliation presented in 
the financial statements, these firms may have already experienced a decrease in audit fees that is 
then further unaffected by deregistration from the U.S.  To examine the impact of the elimination 
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of the U.S. GAAP reconciliation for IFRS users, I utilize the full set of sample and control firm-
year observations.  In the first regression, I include only the years 2006 (pre-elimination) and 2007 
(post-elimination).  I calculate the change in the dependent and independent variables over this 
same time period and include an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 for firms affected 
by the reconciliation elimination (i.e. IFRS firms), and 0 otherwise.  The results (untabulated) show 
that, in the year around this regulation, IFRS firms experienced no significant incremental change 
in their audit fees.  Next, I conduct a difference-in-difference analysis for a longer-time series.  The 
model now contains an indicator variable for post-2007 observations and interacts this variable 
with the treatment group (IFRS firms).   I find (untabulated) that there is no significant association 
between audit fees and the post-2007 period for IFRS firms cross-listed in the U.S.   Thus, it does 
not appear that this regulation change in 2007 significantly decreased audit fees for IFRS firms in 
the U.S. and thus does not explain the earlier reported results that the significant decrease in audit 
fees following deregistration is isolated to non-IFRS firms.    
2.6       Conclusion 
By incorporating an important element that did not exist at the time of their studies, namely 
the growing use of IFRS, I extend the results in Seetharaman et al. (2002) and Choi et al. (2009) 
to show the cross-listing audit fee premium disappears for firms whose audit complexity decreases 
after deregistration (non-IFRS firms), while firms with no changes in complexity (IFRS firms) 
experience no significant audit fee changes around deregistration.  This result is attributable to the 
significant changes in the accounting and auditing landscape brought about by IFRS adoption in 
the past decade (Kim et al. 2012; DeGeorge et al. 2013).    
This paper exploits the unique setting of deregistration from the U.S. By adding interactive 
effects with institutional variables, I am able to determine the source of the negative association 
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between deregistration and audit fees (e.g. Leuz 2003a). While there is self-selection involved in 
the decision to voluntary deregister from the U.S., the setting allows me to conduct multiple levels 
of analysis to ensure I capture post-deregistration effects only.  I use the firm as its own control, 
conduct a difference-in-difference test with matched non-deregistering firms, and compare both 
the levels and changes in audit fees to mitigate the effect of concurrent changes in home country 
economies and institutions and focus on the effect the firm’s departure from the U.S. has on audit 
fees.  The results in this paper extend and support the notion that the use of IFRS has impacted the 
market of cross-border listings.    
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of new Cross-Listings and Deregistrations on Major U.S. Exchanges from 
2004-2013 
This figure plots the new cross-listings and deregistrations from major U.S. stock exchanges (AMEX, NASDAQ, and 
NYSE) from 2004 to 2013.  The data is plotted as a percentage of total foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges. The 
data is obtained from the World Federation of Exchanges, the online ADR directories of Bank of New York, Citibank, 
and JP Morgan Chase, and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2009). 
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Table 2.1: Sample composition   
 Panel A: Voluntary foreign firm deregistrations 2004-2013 
Edgar Online I-Metrix Form 15F filings of voluntary & involuntary deregistrations         439  
Bank of New York's, CitiBank's, & JP Morgan's internet ADR directories of terminations         352  
Duplicates between two listings        (309) 
Amendment to previously filed Form 15F         (21) 
Firms incorporated in US         (43) 
Firm listed on OTC only, never sold securities in the US         (97) 
Deregistration due to merge & acquisition         (44) 
Delisted by the exchange for violating listing standards           (8) 
Deregistered debt securities only         (78) 
Missing data in Worldscope         (61) 
Financial firms         (12) 
Canadian firms         (13) 
Full Sample        105  
This panel reports how the final sample of 105 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from the U.S. was obtained. 
Form 15F filings of all foreign firm deregistrations was collected from the Edgar Online I-Metrix database. This was 
supplemented with listings of terminated ADR programs on Bank of New York, Citibank, and JP Morgan’s websites.  
Duplicates between the four sources of deregistering foreign firms were removed.  The sample is further restricted by 
eliminating any firms incorporated in the U.S.  The population of Form 15F filings obtained from Edgar contained 
some amendments to previously filed Form 15F’s and as such are excluded.  Firms that were listed on the OTC only 
were eliminated to limit the sample to firms required to regularly file with the SEC.  Involuntary deregistrations are 
those due to merger and acquisitions or violations of listing standards. Those firms that deregistered debt securities 
only are also excluded.  Finally, financial firms, firms without sufficient data in Worldscope, and Canadian firms are 
removed. 
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Panel B: Sample by year and country 
Voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from the U.S. by Year 
2004 8     
2005 6     
2006 10     
2007 45     
2008 10     
2009 11     
2010 5     
2011 4     
2012 2     
2013 4     
 105     
 
Voluntary foreign firm deregistrations from the U.S. by country (with IFRS adoption year) 
AUSTRALIA (2005) 6 NETHERLANDS (2005) 5 
AUSTRIA (2005) 1 NEW ZEALAND (2007) 4 
BELGIUM (2005) 1 NORWAY (2007) 3 
CHILE (2009) 1 PORTUGAL (2005) 1 
FINLAND (2005) 3 SINGAPORE (n/a) 2 
FRANCE (2005) 12 SOUTH AFRICA (2005) 2 
GERMANY (2005) 13 SPAIN (2005) 1 
HONG KONG (2005) 5 SWEDEN (2005) 3 
INDIA (n/a) 1 SWITZERLAND (n/a) 4 
ITALY (2005) 4 UNITED KINGDOM (2005) 23 
JAPAN (n/a) 10   
      105 
This panel breaks down the 105 voluntary foreign firm deregistrations by year and country. Next to each country is 
the year of mandatory IFRS adoption within the jurisdiction, if applicable.  
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics                
  
Deregistering:  
Pre-Deregistration   
Deregistering:  
Post-Deregistration   
  N Mean Median   N Mean   Median   
ln(Audit Fees) 105 15.659 15.758   105 14.907 ** 15.202 ** 
IFRS 105 0.686 1.000  105 0.719  1.000  
Regime 105 1.910 1.828  105 1.910  1.828  
ln(Assets) 105 22.519 22.739  105 22.549  22.794  
Inv_Rec 105 0.246 0.243  105 0.251  0.251  
ROA 105 -0.007 0.038  105 -0.030  0.038  
Current Ratio 105 2.750 1.421  105 2.348  1.307  
Leverage 105 0.626 0.607  105 0.644  0.599  
Loss 105 0.229 0.000  105 0.286  0.000  
Ln(Bus Seg) 105 1.106 1.099  105 1.145  1.386  
Ln(Geo Seg) 105 1.229 1.609  105 1.157  1.386  
December YE 105 0.619 1.000  105 0.619  1.000  
Acquisition 105 0.867 1.000  105 0.857  1.000  
Qualified 105 0.000 0.000  105 0.000  0.000  
Big4 105 0.943 1.000   105 0.943   1.000   
This panel details the characteristics of the 105 foreign firms that voluntary deregistered from U.S. exchanges from 
2004-2013.  Deregistering firms are compared in the year before deregistration to the year after deregistration, with 
the year of deregistration removed from the analysis.  All firm-level data are obtained from Worldscope, except as 
noted below. Ln(Audit Fees) is the natural logarithm of audit fees. IFRS is an indicator variable coded 1 for firm-years 
in which financial statements were prepared according to IFRS and 0 otherwise.  Regime is the natural logarithm of 
the Wingate (1997) index. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Inv_Rec is the ratio of the sum of 
inventories and receivables to total assets. ROA is the ratio of the net income to total assets. Current Ratio is the ratio 
of current assets to current liabilities. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets.  Loss is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of 1 for firm-year observations with negative earnings, and 0 otherwise. Ln(Bus Seg) and Ln(Geo Seg) 
are the natural logarithms of the number of business and geographic segments, respectively.   DecemberYE is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firms with a December fiscal yearend, and 0 otherwise.  Acquisition is 
an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has acquired or disposed of a subsidiary or associate, and 0 
otherwise.  Qualified is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm received a qualified audit opinion and 
0 otherwise. Big4 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm was audited by a Big-4 auditor and 0 
otherwise.  ***, **, and * indicate that deregistering firms’ characteristics before deregistration are significantly 
different from their characteristics after deregistration at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.3: Levels analyses—deregistering firms 
  ln(Audit Fees) ln(Audit Fees) ln(Audit Fees) ln(Audit Fees) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post -0.640*** -0.848* -1.491*** -0.974* 
 (3.60) (1.67) (3.54) (1.84) 
Regime -2.092 -2.196 -1.683 -1.354 
 (1.26) (1.30) (1.09) (0.93) 
Post*Regime  0.109  -0.309 
  (0.40)  (0.94) 
IFRS 0.910 0.942 0.144 -0.012 
 (1.27) (1.27) (0.20) (0.02) 
Post*IFRS   1.118*** 1.212*** 
   (2.69) (2.62) 
ln(Assets) 0.662*** 0.663*** 0.655*** 0.650*** 
 (13.13) (13.21) (14.34) (14.68) 
Inv_Rec 0.866 0.860 0.939 0.964 
 (1.28) (1.27) (1.61) (1.65) 
Leverage 0.317 0.310 0.274 0.291 
 (1.17) (1.14) (1.06) (1.13) 
ROA 0.072 0.075 0.075 0.065 
 (0.47) (0.49) (0.49) (0.43) 
Current Ratio 0.020 0.021 0.011 0.008 
 (0.83) (0.85) (0.49) (0.37) 
Loss 0.219 0.225 0.205 0.185 
 (1.26) (1.30) (1.26) (1.14) 
Ln(Bus Seg) 0.025 0.023 0.019 0.023 
 (0.24) (0.23) (0.20) (0.24) 
Ln(Geo Seg) -0.021 -0.017 -0.016 -0.027 
 (0.23) (0.18) (0.19) (0.31) 
Acquisition -0.013 -0.015 -0.121 -0.123 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.57) (0.57) 
Big 4 0.099 0.104 0.249 0.249 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.54) (0.54) 
December YE 0.162 0.164 0.198 0.197 
 (0.83) (0.83) (1.15) (1.14) 
Intercept 7.332** 7.551** 5.096 4.286 
 (2.03) (2.04) (1.49) (1.28) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
N 210 210 210 210 
In this table deregistering firms are compared before and after deregistration.  The dependent variable in the OLS 
regression is Ln(Audit Fees) as defined in Table 2.2.  Post is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for all 
observations after deregistration from the U.S. and 0 otherwise.  All other variables are as defined in Table 2.2.  The 
t-statistics are listed in parenthesis below the coefficients. They are adjusted for clustering on firms.  ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.4: Difference-in-difference—deregistering & matched non-deregistering firms 
  ln(Audit Fees) ln(Audit Fees) ln(Audit Fees) ln(Audit Fees) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post -0.054 0.124 -0.001 0.103 
 (0.43) (0.34) (0.00) (0.27) 
Dereg 0.305*** 0.534** 0.269*** 0.489** 
 (4.09) (2.30) (2.66) (2.05) 
Post*Dereg -0.521*** -0.681 -1.049*** -0.971** 
 (3.70) (1.50) (3.86) (2.06) 
Regime 0.364*** 0.377*** 0.360*** 0.374*** 
 (5.20) (5.30) (5.14) (5.26) 
Post*Regime  -0.025  -0.015 
  (0.52)  (0.31) 
Dereg*Regime  -0.032  -0.031 
  (1.04)  (1.02) 
Post*Dereg*Regime  0.022  -0.017 
  (0.36)  (0.27) 
IFRS -0.079 -0.067 -0.187 -0.192 
 (0.45) (0.38) (0.95) (0.97) 
Post*IFRS   -0.05 -0.035 
   (0.19) (0.13) 
Dereg*IFRS   0.054 0.063 
   (0.38) (0.45) 
Post*Dereg*IFRS   0.677** 0.717** 
   (2.10) (2.15) 
ln(Assets) 0.717*** 0.712*** 0.725*** 0.720*** 
 (39.01) (37.52) (37.92) (36.62) 
Inv_Rec 1.263*** 1.255*** 1.256*** 1.256*** 
 (4.30) (4.26) (4.28) (4.27) 
Leverage 0.051 0.051 0.061 0.067 
 (0.97) (0.98) (1.17) (1.26) 
ROA -0.205 -0.201 -0.218 -0.223 
 (1.13) (1.09) (1.20) (1.22) 
Current Ratio -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.053*** -0.053*** 
 (6.77) (6.78) (6.50) (6.48) 
Loss 0.118 0.109 0.131 0.116 
 (1.32) (1.21) (1.46) (1.29) 
Ln(Bus Seg) 0.072 0.067 0.068 0.062 
 (1.57) (1.45) (1.47) (1.35) 
Ln(Geo Seg) -0.016 -0.014 -0.018 -0.017 
 (0.33) (0.29) (0.38) (0.35) 
Acquisition 0.000 0.003 -0.013 -0.008 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.15) (0.09) 
Big 4 0.379* 0.373* 0.366* 0.354* 
 (1.83) (1.80) (1.76) (1.70) 
December YE 0.530*** 0.525*** 0.539*** 0.532*** 
 (5.01) (4.94) (5.11) (5.03) 
Qualified 0.197 0.174 0.168 0.138 
 (0.37) (0.33) (0.32) (0.26) 
Intercept -3.721*** -3.715*** -3.816*** -3.804*** 
 (3.41) (3.40) (3.50) (3.48) 
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Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.91 
N 942 942 942 942 
In this panel deregistering firms are compared after deregistration to a matched sample of non-deregistering cross-
listed firms.  Dereg is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for all deregistering firms (i.e. treatment firms) 
and 0 for all non-deregistering firms (i.e. control firms) throughout the entire sample period.  Post is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 for all observations after the year of deregistration for deregistering firms or pseudo-
year of deregistration for matched non-deregistering firms and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Table 
2.2.  The t-statistics are listed in parenthesis below the coefficients. They are adjusted for clustering on firms.  ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 2.5: Audit fee changes—deregistering firms only 
  ln(AF)t+1 - ln(AF)t-1  ln(AF)t+1 - ln(AF)t-1  
  (1) (2) 
ΔRuleLaw -0.389  
 (0.67)  
Regime  -0.497 
  (0.50) 
ΔComplexity -0.936*** -0.936*** 
 (2.75) (2.70) 
Δln(Assets) 0.548*** 0.545*** 
 (3.16) (3.08) 
ΔInvRec 2.553** 2.539** 
 (2.20) (2.16) 
ΔLeverage 0.516 0.514 
 (0.85) (0.81) 
ΔROA 0.440 0.441 
 (0.80) (0.78) 
ΔCurrent Ratio 0.054 0.054 
 (0.96) (0.88) 
Loss-to-NoLoss  -0.196 -0.195 
 (0.84) (0.82) 
NoLoss-to-Loss  0.312* 0.312* 
 (1.71) (1.68) 
Acq-to-NoAcq  0.011 0.007 
 (0.05) (0.03) 
NoAcq-to-Acq  -0.175 -0.174 
 (0.71) (0.69) 
ΔLn(Bus Seg) 0.124 0.122 
 (1.34) (1.29) 
ΔLn(Geo Seg) 0.002 0.001 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
   Intercept 0.129 1.325 
 (0.71) (0.60) 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
R2 0.43 0.41 
N 110 105 
In this table, the dependent variable in the OLS regression is ∆Ln(Audit Fees) which is the difference in audit fees 
from year t-1 to year t+1.  ∆RuleLaw takes the value of 1 for all firms that experienced a decrease in legal liability 
relative to the U.S. after deregistration, and 0 otherwise using the World Bank Rule of Law index.  ∆Complexity takes 
the value of 1 for all firms that returned to non-IFRS home markets, and thus experienced a decrease in complexity 
after deregistration, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Table 2.2.  The t-statistics are listed in 
parenthesis below the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 2.6: Audit fee changes—deregistering firms & matched non-deregistering firms 
  ln(AF)t+1 - ln(AF)t-1  ln(AF)t+1 - ln(AF)t-1  
  (1) (2) 
ΔCross-listing status -0.544*** -0.640*** 
 (5.37) (8.02) 
ΔRuleLaw -0.159  
 (0.99)  
Regime  0.135 
  (0.24) 
ΔComplexity -0.427** -0.436** 
 (2.04) (2.1) 
Δln(Assets) 0.527*** 0.523*** 
 (4.48) (4.48) 
ΔInvRec 1.742** 1.640** 
 (2.14) (2.03) 
ΔLeverage 0.091 -0.021 
 (0.22) (0.05) 
ΔROA 0.162 0.206 
 (0.39) (0.49) 
ΔCurrent Ratio 0.03 0.017 
 (0.68) (0.37) 
Loss-to-NoLoss  -0.255 -0.263 
 (1.57) (1.62) 
NoLoss-to-Loss  0.191 0.207 
 (1.44) (1.57) 
Acq-to-NoAcq  0.016 0.026 
 (0.11) (0.17) 
NoAcq-to-Acq  0.041 0.06 
 (0.25) (0.37) 
Dec-to-NoDec -0.247 -0.18 
 (0.37) (0.28) 
Unqualified-to-Qualified 0.021 0.021 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
ΔLn(Bus Seg) 0.094 0.085 
 (1.25) (1.11) 
ΔLn(Geo Seg) -0.059 -0.059 
 (0.91) (0.91) 
Intercept 0.600*** 0.317 
 (3.82) (0.25) 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
R2 0.50 0.51 
N 220 210 
In this table, deregistering firms are compared in the year after deregistration to a matched sample of firms that did 
not deregister.  ∆Cross-listingStatus takes the value of 1 for all deregistering firms and 0 otherwise.  All other variables 
are as defined in Table 2.2 or Table 2.5.  The t-statistics are listed in parenthesis below the coefficients. They are 
adjusted for clustering on firms.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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